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Judicial Review of Refugee 
Determinations: The Luck of the 
Draw?
Sean Rehaag*
Judicial review is often the only way to correct errors made by the Immigration and Refugee 
Board in refugee determinations. Applicants must seek leave from the Federal Court, where 
a judge will decide if their case is suitable for judicial review. The stakes are high for refugee 
claimants confronting deportation to countries where they may face persecution, torture or 
death.
The author reviews over 23 000 applications for judicial review from 2005 to 2010, and 
finds troubling inconsistency in leave grant rates at the Federal Court. Over 36 per cent of 
judges deviated by more than 50 per cent from the average rate of granting leave, with twenty 
judges granting leave more than ten times as often as the judge with the lowest leave grant rate. 
This inconsistency continues at the judicial review stage. The author considers several external 
factors that could explain it, from the judge’s political party of appointment to the impact of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on standard of review in Dunsmuir. Ultimately, the 
author concludes that the outcome of a leave application hinges largely on which judge is assigned 
to decide the application, and that this poses an arbitrary barrier to access to justice for refugees.
The author considers various solutions to this problem, from abolishing the leave 
requirement to requiring written reasons or a panel of judges. At a minimum, he suggests 
that the test for leave should be clarified, as the limited jurisprudence has provided insufficient 
guidance to judges. Forthcoming reforms to the refugee determination system, including 
the introduction of the Refugee Appeal Division, will in his view increase rather than 
diminish the importance of fair and consistent judicial review of refugee determinations.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful for the painstaking research 
assistance provided by Umair Abdul, Simran Bakshi, Dette Bourchier, Monica Cop, Justin 
Dharamdial, Adrienne Lipsey, Anastasia Mandziuk, Ian McKellar, Alex Minkin, Jessica 
Lynne Morris, Nedko Petkov, Sharmin Rahman and Rathika Vasavithasan. I would like 
to thank Richard Haigh, Director of the Osgoode Public Interest Requirement at Osgoode 
Hall Law School, for helping to secure research assistants for this project. I would also like 
to acknowledge the generous financial assistance provided by York University through 
the SSHRC Small Grants Program. Finally, I have greatly benefited from feedback on 
prior versions of the study from several Federal Court judges who attended a presentation 
on 20 January 2012, and from attendees at the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers 
National Conference on 9 March 2012. Comments and suggestions from the anonymous 
peer reviewers were also much appreciated. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in 
this article are current to 27 June 2012.
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Introduction
Refugee determinations are among the most important decisions 
Canadian administrative tribunals and courts are called upon to make. 
If errors in first-instance refugee determinations at the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB) are not caught and corrected through judicial review, 
refugees may be deported to countries where they face persecution, 
torture or death. Refugee claimants who apply for judicial review should, 
therefore, be able to expect that the outcomes of their applications will 
hinge on the merits of the cases they put forward.
Drawing on a database of over 23 000 applications for judicial review 
involving refugee matters from 2005 to 2010 in the Federal Court, this 
study examines whether outcomes in these high-stakes applications turn 
on their merits or on which judge is assigned to decide the application. 
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Unfortunately, as this article reveals, outcomes at the Federal Court over 
the past five years all too often come down to the luck of the draw.
The article begins with an overview of Canada’s existing refugee 
determination system, and the role of the Federal Court within that 
system. Then, after discussing the literature on Federal Court decision 
making in the refugee law context, it sets out the methodology and the 
findings of this study. Finally, the article concludes by offering a number 
of policy recommendations based on the findings of the study and in light 
of the major reforms to Canada’s refugee determination system that are 
expected in the near future.
I. Canada’s Refugee Determination System and 
the Federal Court
For readers unfamiliar with Canada’s existing refugee determination 
process, this section places Federal Court refugee law decision making in 
context. It provides an overview of first-instance refugee determinations 
at the IRB, sets out the processes followed and tests applied in the 
Federal Court at both the application for leave and the judicial review 
stages, discusses appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada, and outlines subsequent immigration procedures that 
unsuccessful refugee claimants may access before removal from Canada.
A. Refugee Decisions at the Immigration and Refugee Board
Canada’s inland refugee determination system1—which is expected to 
undergo significant revisions shortly2—gives the IRB’s Refugee Protection 
Division (RPD) responsibility for first-instance decisions.3 Refugee 
claimants whose cases are eligible for referral to the RPD4 are entitled 
1. For an overview of the inland refugee determination process, see Martin Jones & Sasha
Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 215–53.
2. See Part IV.D, below, for more on this topic.
3. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 99–101, 170 [IRPA].
4. Ibid, s 100. There are limited grounds for ineligibility, including having made a prior
refugee claim in Canada, having travelled to Canada via a designated safe third country and 
having been found inadmissible due to security concerns, violations of human rights or 
certain types of criminality (ibid, s 101). 
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to hearings5 before RPD Members, who are quasi-judicial administrative 
decision-makers appointed for fixed terms.6 The purpose of the hearing 
is to determine whether claimants meet the definitions of “convention 
refugees”7 or “persons in need of protection”,8 and to determine whether 
claimants who are covered by these definitions are nonetheless excluded 
from refugee protection on grounds related to criminality or violation of 
human rights.9
If the RPD Member denies the refugee claim, written reasons must be 
given after the hearing. Alternatively, if the RPD Member grants refugee 
protection, written reasons need only be given at the request of the 
claimant or the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister).10 
In the case of a negative decision, the RPD Member may also declare the 
claim to have no credible basis if there was no credible or trustworthy 
evidence that could have justified granting refugee protection.11 Such a 
declaration means that the claimant is not entitled to an automatic stay of 
a removal order pending the determination of any application for judicial 
review.
Since 2002, Canada’s immigration legislation has contained provisions 
allowing a claimant or the Minister to appeal an RPD decision on its 
merits to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB,12 but those 
provisions have not yet come into force.13 The failure to implement the 
5.  Ibid, s 170(b). The RPD may grant, but not deny, refugee protection without holding 
a hearing (ibid, s 170(f)). As a matter of constitutional law, refugee claimants in Canada 
are entitled to a hearing whenever credibility is at stake. See Singh v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422.
6.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 153. Only a small proportion of RPD Members have legal 
training (10% of the RPD’s complement are required to be lawyers with at least 5 years of 
experience) (ibid, s 153(4)).
7.  Ibid, s 96.
8.  Ibid, s 97.
9.  Ibid, s 98.
10.  Ibid, s 169. Written reasons must also be provided when refugee protection is granted 
in cases where exclusion due to criminality or violating human rights is at issue. Refugee 
Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, r 61 [RPD Rules].
11.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 107.
12.  Ibid, ss 110–11. 
13.  See ibid, s 275; Order Fixing June 28, 2002 as the Date of the Coming into Force of Certain 
Provisions of the Act, SI/2002-97.
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RAD has been sharply criticized by refugee advocates,14 and is especially 
problematic in light of studies indicating that refugee determinations at 
the RPD appear to turn at least in part on extra-legal considerations.15 
Of particular importance are studies showing massive and unexplained 
variations in refugee claim grant rates from one RPD Member to another, 
even when factors such as the claimant’s country of origin are taken into 
account.16 Because the RAD is not available, there is no recourse within the 
IRB when a claimant believes the RPD erred in a refugee determination, 
whether because of extra-legal factors such as the assignment of the case 
to an RPD Member who seldom or never grants refugee protection,17 
14.  See e.g. Amnesty International Canada, “Canada’s Refugee Appeal Division:
Amnesty’s Issues and Concerns” (16 November 2007), online: Amnesty International 
<http://www.amnesty.ca>; Canadian Council for Refugees, “Refugee Appeal Division 
Backgrounder” (December 2006), online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://ccrweb.
ca> [CCR, “RAD”].
15. Extra-legal factors may include whether the claimant had experienced legal counsel,
the adjudicator’s gender and the political party that appointed the adjudicator. See e.g. 
Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An 
Empirical Assessment” (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 [Rehaag, “Counsel”]; Sean Rehaag, 
“Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make a Difference? An Empirical Analysis of Gender 
and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee Determinations” (2011) 23:2 CJWL 627 [Rehaag, 
“Gender”].
16. See Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39:2
Ottawa L Rev 335 [Rehaag, “Troubling”]. For more recent data on variations in grant rates 
at the RPD, see Sean Rehaag, “UPDATED 2011 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member 
Recognition Rates” (6 August 2012), online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://
ccrweb.ca> [Rehaag, “Data”]. For media investigations of variations in refugee claim grant 
rates, see Marina Jiménez, “Refugee approval rates vary widely”, The Globe and Mail (24 
July 2004) A1, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; David 
McKie, “Fluctuations in refugee rulings trouble critics”, CBC News (17 December 2009), 
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
17. One RPD Member, David McBean, denied refugee status in every case he heard from
the time he was appointed to the IRB in 2008 until 2010. See Nicholas Keung, “Getting 
asylum the luck of the draw?”, Toronto Star (4 March 2011) A1, online: Toronto Star 
<http://www.thestar.com> [Keung, "Luck"].
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or because of more run-of-the-mill errors that are inevitable in any 
administrative decision-making process.18
B. Leave Decisions at the Federal Court
Until the RAD is implemented, the only procedure available when a 
claimant (or the Minister) is unhappy with a first-instance RPD refugee 
determination is to apply for judicial review in the Federal Court.19 
Either party may begin the process of judicial review of an RPD decision 
by filing an application for leave with the Federal Court.20 With a few 
exceptions—such as where the RPD declares a claim to have no credible 
basis—unsuccessful refugee claimants who apply for judicial review 
generally benefit from an automatic stay on removal, pending the 
determination of their application.21
The timelines for applications for leave are tight: the application 
must be filed within 15 days after the RPD sends written reasons.22 The 
respondent has ten days to indicate opposition to the application by filing 
a notice to appear.23 The application must be perfected within 30 days by 
filing an application record, which includes the decision under review, a 
18. While errors are inevitable in all administrative decision-making processes, several
factors in the refugee determination process make them more likely. For example, refugee 
adjudicators must determine what is likely to happen in the future (that in the event that 
a refugee claimant is deported) in a foreign country—frequently a country that is unstable 
and about which little reliable information is available. Moreover, the key evidence is 
typically found in the testimony of the claimant, who may suffer from mental health 
challenges related to surviving traumatic experiences and who often experiences stress as a 
result of the high stakes and unfamiliarity of the hearing process. In addition, testimony is 
generally mediated by an interpreter, and interpretation errors may occur. For a discussion 
of these and other challenges in refugee determination, see CCR, “RAD”, supra note 14.
19. For an overview of the judicial review process, see Jones & Baglay, supra note 1 at 273–
87. See also Federal Court, “Judicial Review (Immigration) Practice Guide” (May 2006),
online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
20. IRPA, supra note 3, s 72.
21. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 231 [IRPA Regulations].
22. IRPA, supra note 3, ss 72, 169(f); Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection
Rules, SOR/93-22, s 5 [FC Immigration Rules]. Where there are “special reasons”, the 
Federal Court may extend the deadline, even after it has expired. IRPA, supra note 3, s 
72(2)(c).
23. FC Immigration Rules, supra note 22, s 8.
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memorandum of argument and supporting affidavits.24 If the respondent 
wants to oppose the application for leave, the respondent then has 30 days 
to file a memorandum of argument and supporting affidavits,25 and the 
applicant may file a reply within ten days.26
A single Federal Court judge (the leave judge) decides whether to 
grant leave in any given case. Applications are not screened before being 
assigned to a particular leave judge, so cases are effectively assigned at 
random. In other words, leave judges—unlike RPD Members who make 
first-instance refugee determinations—do not specialize in particular 
types of applications, or applications involving claimants from particular 
countries.27
Hearings on leave determinations are only held in exceptional 
circumstances,28 so a leave judge usually decides whether to grant leave 
solely on the basis of a review of the court file. Reasons for granting or 
denying leave are not typically provided. When leave is denied, there is 
no further appeal.29
The test for when leave should be granted has not been established 
by legislation or the rules of the court. As Harrington J noted in Hinton 
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), “[t]he parameters 
which should influence a judge’s discretion are not set out. There is very 
24.  Ibid, s 10.
25.  Ibid, s 11. 
26.  Ibid, s 12.
27.  Jon B Gould, Colleen Sheppard & Johannes Wheeldon, “A Refugee from Justice? 
Disparate Treatment in the Federal Court of Canada” (2010) 32:4 Law & Pol’y 454 at 459; 
Ian Greene & Paul Shaffer, “Leave to Appeal and Leave to Commence Judicial Review in 
Canada’s Refugee-Determination System: Is the Process Fair?” (1992) 4:1 Int’l J Refugee L 
71 at 79–81.
28.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 72(2)(d).
29.  Ibid, s 72(2)(e). It should be noted that applicants may bring a motion for 
reconsideration where the denial of leave is inconsistent with reasons provided (if reasons 
were provided), or where a matter that should have been dealt with in denying leave was 
overlooked or accidentally omitted. See Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, s 397. Courts 
have, however, generally interpreted the scope for reconsideration quite narrowly—and it 
is, understandably, difficult to establish that the court overlooked or accidentally omitted 
considering a matter in denying leave when reasons are not typically provided. See e.g. 
Boateng v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 112 NR 318, 11 Imm 
LR (2d) 9 (FCA); Dan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 189 FTR 
301, 6 Imm LR (3d) 84 (see especially at para 17); Key v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2011 FC 92, [2011] FCJ no 403 (QL).
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little guiding jurisprudence, which is not surprising given that reasons are 
usually not provided and that the decision cannot be appealed”.30
Although there is not much jurisprudence in this area, a handful of 
decisions do discuss the leave requirement, usually in cases where the 
test for leave is ancillary to other legal issues. The leading case is Bains 
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),31 where Mahoney J 
said, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the leave requirement:
The only question to be considered in disposing of an application for leave . . . is whether 
or not a fairly arguable case is disclosed for the relief proposed to be sought if leave were 
to be granted. . . . [T]he requirement for leave is in reality the other side of the coin of the 
traditional jurisdiction to summarily terminate proceedings that disclose no reasonably 
arguable case.32
Similarly, in Saleh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),33 
Teitelbaum J offered this analysis of the test for leave: “I am satisfied that 
on an application for leave one should grant such a request unless it is 
plain and obvious that the applicant would have no reasonable chance of 
succeeding”.34
More recently, in Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada,35 Hughes J 
characterized the test for leave in these terms: “the standard for granting 
an Order permitting judicial review is low. The matter at that point is 
to be dealt with in a summary way. The standard on a leave application 
is whether or not a fairly arguable case is disclosed”.36 In Level v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),37 Russell J noted that “[w]hile 
the leave judge determines if there is a serious question to be tried, it is 
the judge on judicial review who has the opportunity to fully consider 
and weigh the merits of the application. . . . [O]n leave to commence an 
application, the merits of the parties’ arguments are not to be considered”.38
30.  2008 FC 1007 at para 15, [2008] 333 FTR 288.
31.  (1990), 47 Admin LR 317, 109 NR 239 (FCA).
32.  Ibid at paras 1, 3.
33.  [1989] FCJ No 825 (QL) (TD).
34.  Ibid. 
35.  2006 FC 1046, 299 FTR 114.
36.  Ibid at para 20. See also Sunarti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2011 FC 191 at para 14, 384 FTR 151.
37.  2010 FC 251, [2011] 3 FCR 60.
38.  Ibid at para 58.
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And finally, in Mina v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration),39 a rare case in which reasons were given for denying leave, 
Shore J said: “In an application for leave and for judicial review, a serious, 
arguable case with serious issues must be submitted”.40
The test for leave has therefore been variably described in the following 
terms: a reasonably arguable case; a fairly arguable case; a serious question 
to be tried; and whether it is plain and obvious that the applicant has no 
reasonable prospect of success. However formulated, the test is highly 
permissive: leave should be granted unless it is clear that the judicial 
review application has no reasonable chance of success, namely, where 
it is so obvious that the application must fail that a determination on the 
merits is unnecessary.
C. Judicial Review Decisions at the Federal Court
In cases where leave is granted, a hearing will be scheduled between 30 
and 90 days later.41 The leave judge will also set timelines for filing further 
documents, including the tribunal record from the IRB, and further 
memoranda of argument from the parties.42
A Federal Court judge (JR judge), other than the leave judge, presides 
over the hearing. The JR judge must determine whether the applicant 
has established that the RPD committed a reviewable and material error. 
The Federal Court can overturn an RPD decision where the RPD (1) 
acted outside or beyond its jurisdiction; (2) breached principles of natural 
justice or procedural fairness; (3) erred in law; (4) made findings of fact 
that were perverse or capricious, or were made without due regard to the 
available evidence; (5) acted as a result of fraud or perjury; or (6) acted 
contrary to law.43
Judicial review is an administrative law process and is subject to 
Canadian administrative law norms, including norms on the level of 
deference courts must show administrative tribunals. The Federal Court 
is generally deferential toward findings of fact and of mixed fact and law 
39.  2010 FC 1182, [2010] FCJ no 1482 (QL).
40.  Ibid at para 6.
41.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 74(b).
42.  FC Immigration Rules, supra note 22, r 15(1).
43.  Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(4).
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made by RPD Members. In reviewing such findings it applies a standard 
of “reasonableness”,44 on which the question is not whether the JR judge 
would have made different findings but whether the findings that were 
made were reasonably open to the RPD Member and were adequately 
justified. As the Supreme Court put it in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,45
[a] court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make 
a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to 
outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of 
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it 
is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.46
In immigration and refugee matters, the Federal Court applies the more 
exacting standard of “correctness” in some issues of law, including issues 
of jurisdiction and procedural fairness.47 When using this standard of 
review, the JR judge essentially reconsiders the issue de novo and shows 
no deference to the RPD.48
Where the JR judge is of the view that (on the appropriate standard 
of review) the RPD Member committed a reviewable and material error, 
the judge typically sets aside the RPD decision and orders that the matter 
be referred back for redetermination by a different RPD Member. The 
JR judge can, however, provide more specific directions to the RPD, 
including a direction that the claimant be accorded refugee protection.49 
The JR judge usually gives written reasons for the judgment, although 
orders can be issued without reasons.
D. Appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada
In cases where leave has been granted, the decision of the JR judge on 
the merits may be subject to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, but on 
tightly limited grounds. A party may appeal only if the JR judge issuing 
44.  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 46, [2009] 1 
SCR 339.
45.  2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
46.  Ibid at para 47.
47.  Khosa, supra note 44 at paras 41–48.
48.  Dunsmuir, supra note 45 at para 50.
49.  Federal Courts Act, supra note 43, s 18.1(3).
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the Federal Court decision certifies that the decision raises a “serious 
question of general importance . . . and states the question”.50 Where a JR 
judge certifies a question and a party decides to proceed with an appeal, 
the Federal Court of Appeal is not limited to answering only the stated 
question but can reconsider all relevant issues.51
In a case where the leave judge denies leave, or where leave is granted 
but the JR judge does not certify questions for appeal, the decision is final 
and cannot be appealed.52 Where a question is certified for appeal by the 
JR judge and the case proceeds to the Federal Court of Appeal, a further 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is possible, but only with leave 
from the Supreme Court. Such leave is given only in rare cases that raise 
issues of public importance.53
E. Subsequent Immigration Procedures
Aside from appeals, unsuccessful refugee claimants may access 
subsequent immigration procedures, including Humanitarian and 
Compassionate applications (H&C applications) and Pre-Removal Risk 
Assessments (PRRAs).
An H&C application is a request that the Minister exercise discretion 
to make an exception from Canada’s regular immigration requirements 
on humanitarian grounds—on the grounds that the applicant would 
face “unusual, undeserved or disproportionate hardship” if required to 
leave Canada.54 Usually the requested exception is that the applicant 
be given permanent residence in Canada, even though she does not 
qualify for any existing immigration program. While many unsuccessful 
refugee claimants make H&C applications, it should be noted that these 
applications do not provide refugees who allege that the RPD erroneously 
50.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 74(d).
51.  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 12, 
174 DLR (4th) 193.
52.  IRPA, supra note 3, ss 72(2)(e), 74(d).
53.  Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40.
54.  Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 11 at para 18, 
340 FTR 29. See also IRPA, supra note 3, s 25.1; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
Operational Manuals, IP5: Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or 
Compassionate Grounds (2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://
www.cic.gc.ca>.
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denied their claims with the opportunity to have their cases reassessed 
before they are removed from Canada. H&C applicants can be removed 
from the country pending determination of their applications. Moreover, 
since 2010, the Minister (when assessing an H&C application) has been 
prohibited from taking into account any risks to the claimant that could 
have been considered in the refugee determination process.55
PRRAs represent a final opportunity, before removal from Canada, 
for applicants to demonstrate that they face risks of persecution, risks 
to life, risks of torture or risks of cruel and unusual treatment.56 Once 
again, however, this procedure does not provide an opportunity to 
correct errors made by the RPD. Applicants who made refugee claims 
may only present evidence which arose after the refugee hearing or which 
the claimant could not reasonably have presented at the hearing.57 As a 
result, for unsuccessful refugee claimants, PRRAs are generally of no use 
unless something happens between the hearing and the PRRA decision58 
to enable a claimant to meet the criteria for refugee status—for example, if 
conditions in the claimant’s country have deteriorated.
Although immigration procedures are available, they do not provide 
individuals whose claims were erroneously denied by the RPD with a 
meaningful opportunity to show that they should not be deported from 
Canada to face persecution, torture or even death. As a result, the right 
of unsuccessful refugee claimants to access Federal Court judicial review 
of negative RPD determinations represents the sole opportunity for the 
Canadian legal system to catch mistakes in the refugee determination 
process.59
55.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 25(1.3).
56.  Ibid, ss 112–14. See also Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Manuals, 
PP3: Pre-removal Risk Assessment (2009), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
<http://www.cic.gc.ca>.
57.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 113(a).
58.  See e.g. Doumbouya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1187, 
[2007] FCJ no 1553 (QL) (“[t]he PRRA process is intended to assess new risk developments 
between the IRB hearing and the scheduled removal date” at para 37).
59.  Unsuccessful refugee claimants may turn to international human rights bodies once all 
domestic remedies are exhausted. However, the decisions of these bodies are not, in most 
cases, binding either as a matter of international or domestic law. Moreover, non-citizens 
are frequently deported while decisions of international human rights bodies are pending. 
See e.g. Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 58 OR (3d) 107, 
208 DLR (4th) 66 (CA); Sogi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 
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Against this background, let us now turn to an assessment of how 
well the judicial review process for unsuccessful refugee claimants actually 
works.
II. Existing Empirical Studies
Several studies have offered empirical assessments of judicial review 
of refugee determinations in Canada. These studies are part of a growing 
body of empirical legal scholarship examining judicial decision making 
in Canada and elsewhere.60 This wider scholarship demonstrates that 
outcomes in judicial processes may often turn on factors other than the 
merits of a case. Among the myriad of extra-legal factors that have been 
found to drive outcomes are the judge assigned to hear the case and the 
various aspects of that judge’s identity such as gender, political party of 
appointment and political orientation.61
Of course, some variability in the approaches of different judges is 
to be expected, as they bring a variety of life experiences to the bench.62 
Indeed, some of the strongest arguments for increasing the demographic 
diversity of the judiciary invoke benefits to the courts—and the likelihood 
that they would at times come to different substantive conclusions—if 
currently unrepresented life experiences and perspectives were brought 
799, 158 ACWS (3d) 637; Dadar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 
FC 382, 147 ACWS (3d) 277; Mugesera c Kenney, 2012 QCCS 116, 37 Admin LR (5th) 137.
60.  For a review of empirical legal scholarship, see Michael Heise, “An Empirical Analysis 
of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990–2009” [2011:5] U Ill L Rev 1739. See 
also Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
61.  See e.g. James Stribopoulos & Moin A Yahya, “Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment 
or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 315; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy 
Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making 
in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Donald R Songer, The 
Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008); Cass R Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political?: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
62.  Roderick A Macdonald & FR Scott, “Parametres of Politics in Judicial Appointments” 
(Quebec: Commission of Inquiry into the Appointment Process for Judges in Quebec, 
2010).
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onto the bench.63 Nonetheless, the rule of law may be undermined if 
extra-legal factors come to play a central role in determining judicial 
outcomes.64 When one looks at judicial reviews of refugee determinations, 
the question therefore is not whether outcomes will vary with the judge 
who hears the case—surely they will. Rather, the question is whether the 
degree of variability is within acceptable bounds, and if not, what can be 
done about it.65
A. Greene 
As discussed below, the leave requirement for unsuccessful refugee 
claimants who seek judicial review first came into effect in 1989 amid 
significant controversy.66 Soon afterwards, Ian Greene undertook 
an empirical study of how refugee claimants fared in Federal Court 
applications for leave.67 In an article published in 1992 setting out 
preliminary results, Greene explained why the study was done:
63.  See Justice Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 
28:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 507; The Honourable Sonia Sotomayor, “A Latina Judge’s Voice” 
(2002) 13:1 La Raza LJ 87.
64.  Consistency in judicial decision making is often described as a key feature of the rule 
of law. Lon Fuller, for example, argued that applying the law as announced, and deciding 
cases according to promulgated norms rather than on an ad hoc basis, are constitutive 
features of legality. The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969). Many legal theorists from various traditions agree with Fuller on this point. See e.g. 
Ronald Dworkin, “Philosophy, Morality, and Law—Observations Prompted by Professor 
Fuller’s Novel Claim” (1964–1965) 113:5 U Pa L Rev 668 at 669; Jürgen Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by 
William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996) at 144; HLA Hart, The Concept of 
Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 207; John Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 270–71.
65.  Several US scholars have offered a meticulous and comprehensive analysis of whether 
variability across judges is excessive in the American refugee determination system, and of 
measures that could be taken to reduce this variability. See e.g. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew 
I Schoenholtz & Philip G Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and 
Proposals for Reform (New York: New York University Press, 2009).
66.  See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
67.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27. See also Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-
Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1998) at 
19–21 [Greene, “Final Appeal”].
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A uniform and just application of the law is particularly important in cases of refugee 
determination because of the severe human consequences which may result if the law 
is misapplied. Further, failure to ensure that the law is consistently applied may violate 
guarantees of fundamental justice in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice under Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.68
To test whether the new leave requirement posed barriers to a “uniform 
and just application of the law” in refugee determinations, the study 
reviewed court files in all applications for leave filed in 1990, leading 
to a dataset of 2 081 applications.69 It found statistically significant 
correlations—at unusually high confidence levels—between individual 
leave judges and leave outcomes.70 In fact, the variations in leave grant 
rates from one judge to another were described as “nothing short of 
astounding”.71 For example, while the average leave grant rate for all cases 
reviewed was 25%,72 Pratte J granted leave in only 14% of his cases (203 
decisions), and Desjardins J granted leave in 48% of hers (188 decisions).73
Greene’s analysis also showed that patterns in the assignment of cases 
to particular judges did not appear to account for those variations.74 
Nonetheless, to further test whether the caseloads assigned to individual 
judges differed in some relevant way, Greene retained an expert in 
immigration law to conduct a blind review of 390 randomly selected 
case files to independently assess whether, in that expert’s view, leave 
should have been granted.75 The purpose of this exercise was not to 
discern whether leave really ought to have been granted in each case, 
but whether the rates at which the expert would have granted leave 
varied for applications decided by different judges. It turned out that the 
68.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 75.
69.  Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 19–21. In 1990, 2 341 applications for leave 
were filed. However, data could not be collected on 260 cases (ibid at 220, n 47).
70.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 78.
71.  Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 20.
72.  Ibid at 220, n 47.
73.  Ibid at 20–21.
74.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 79–81. See also Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 
67 at 19, n 44 and accompanying text.
75.  The review was “blind” in the sense that the expert was not informed of the outcome 
in the application or the identity of the judge who decided it. See Greene, “Final Appeal”, 
supra note 67 at 220, n 45.
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expert’s leave grant rate was consistent across cases assigned to different 
leave judges. This further supported the conclusion that variations in 
leave grant rates across judges related to how individual judges decided 
the applications, rather than to patterns in the cases assigned to them.76 
On the basis of the findings, Greene said that “[t]here is no escaping the 
conclusion that given the same law and the same kind of factual issues, 
some judges took a ‘strict’ approach to granting leave . . . while others 
took a more ‘liberal’ approach”.77
Where a judicial review application was heard and determined on the 
merits after leave had been granted, Greene went on to compare those 
final outcomes in cases where leave was granted by “strict” judges and 
by “liberal” judges, in an attempt to see “whether the ‘strict’ judges were 
better at screening out weak cases at the leave stage than the ‘liberal’ 
judges”.78 Interestingly, however, no statistically significant correlation 
was found between rates of success on the merits (once leave was granted) 
and whether the leave judge had a high or low rate of granting leave.79 
This led the authors to conclude that “refugee applicants who were 
unfortunate enough to have their leave applications come before a ‘strict’ 
judge may have had less access to justice in the long run than those who 
were lucky enough to have their applications come before a more ‘liberal’ 
judge”.80
Greene and Shaffer argued that the study conclusively demonstrated 
that the leave requirement, as it was applied in 1990, limited access by 
refugee claimants to an effective and fair appeal process, in a way that 
arguably violated constitutional norms of procedural justice.81 One way 
to address this concern, they suggested, was the adoption of a practice 
common in many appellate courts of deciding cases by panels of several 
judges, “to mitigate the effects of individual judicial predispositions”.82 
Another suggestion was for the court to modify the leave process so that 
when one judge refused to grant leave, the matter would be automatically 
76.  Ibid at 19–20.
77.  Ibid at 20.
78.  Ibid at 21.
79.  Ibid.
80.  Ibid at 21.
81.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 82.
82.  Ibid.
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reviewed by a second judge who could either confirm the decision or 
grant leave.83
B. Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon
Jon Gould, Colleen Sheppard and Johannes Wheeldon updated 
the Greene study with new data from 2003. They examined a sample 
of 617 court files in applications filed in 2003 for leave and judicial 
review involving immigration decisions.84 Because they were interested 
in examining both leave decisions and decisions on the merits where 
leave was granted, they oversampled cases where leave was granted to 
ensure a sufficiently large pool of cases decided on the merits. This led 
to two groups of cases: 275 applications where leave was denied, and 342 
applications where leave was granted. Various data points were collected 
for each application, including outcomes and demographic details of 
applicants, judges and counsel. A panel of five immigration law experts 
was also consulted to assess the “ideological reputation” of the judges 
whose decisions were under consideration.85
The study found that a variety of factors correlated with patterns in 
outcomes both at the leave stage and on the merits. These factors included 
the type of application (immigration applicant versus refugee applicant)86 
and the gender, age and country of origin of the applicant.87 Applicants 
represented by lawyers were much more likely to be granted leave than 
83.  Greene, “Final Appeal”, supra note 67 at 221, n 49.
84.  Supra note 27 at 465.
85.  Ibid at 465–67.
86.  Unlike the prior study, this study examined applications for judicial review involving 
both immigration law and refugee law. Many aspects of the process for judicial review are 
similar in these two contexts. For example, leave is required for both. See IRPA, supra note 
3, s 72. However, there are also important differences. For instance, in many immigration 
law applications for judicial review, there is no automatic stay on removal pending the 
determination of judicial review, whereas most refugee applicants benefit from automatic 
stays of removal. See IRPA Regulations, supra note 21, s 231. Similarly, in many immigration 
law applications, constitutional due process norms are attenuated, whereas in refugee law 
applications, robust constitutional due process norms are almost always engaged. Compare 
Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR 711, 90 DLR 
(4th) 289, with Singh, supra note 5. 
87.  Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 27 at 467–75.
(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ18
unrepresented applicants.88 In the authors’ words, “these findings . . . are 
troubling. . . . A system designed to provide due process of law ought not 
to be tilted in favor of those who can hire an experienced lawyer, and yet 
that is exactly what is happening”.89 The personal characteristics of judges 
were also found to be important factors. For example, at the leave stage, 
“a judge’s ideology had a significant, powerful effect . . . with liberal 
judges more likely than conservative judges to grant an applicant leave”.90 
The same pattern was observed in decisions on the merits.91 In addition, 
the authors found that: “Francophone judges [were] . . . more skeptical 
of the merits of immigration appeals, even when controlling for the fact 
that they [were] more conservative than their Anglophone colleagues”.92
Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon concluded that their findings 
reaffirmed the Greene study’s central conclusion—namely, that outcomes 
hinged at least in part on extra-legal factors, including which judge 
was assigned to decide an application.93 This underscored concerns 
they suggested about how the Federal Court treated immigration and 
asylum cases and raised “questions about the very legitimacy of Canada’s 
immigration and refugee system”.94
C. Butler
A more recent investigative report by journalist Don Butler echoes 
some of the findings of the Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon study.95 
Butler reviewed “480 immigration, refugee and citizenship decisions 
issued by the Federal Court between January and June 2011”.96 Cases were 
identified by searching reasons for decisions posted on the Federal Court’s 
website for applications involving citizenship or immigration, and then 
by excluding decisions dealing only with procedural matters, such as costs 
88.  Ibid at 471.
89.  Ibid at 475.
90.  Ibid at 477.
91.  Ibid.
92.  Ibid at 478.
93.  Ibid at 481.
94.  Ibid at 482.
95.  Don Butler, “Would-be immigrants face uncertain justice”, Ottawa Citizen (26 
November 2011) A1, online: <http://www.ottawacitizen.com>.
96.  Ibid.
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awards.97 Outcomes in the identified cases were then examined in light of 
which judge issued the decision, the judge’s gender and political party of 
appointment, and whether the judge was from Quebec.98
Butler reported that there were significant differences in rates at 
which different judges overturned immigration decisions. For example, 
Blanchard J overturned such decisions in 14% of the seven cases identified, 
whereas Campbell J overturned them in 100% of the 16 cases identified. 
More generally, according to Butler, “outcomes appear to split on party 
lines”, with judges appointed by Liberal Party prime ministers more likely 
to overturn immigration decisions than judges appointed by Progressive 
Conservative or Conservative party prime ministers. Male judges and 
judges from Quebec were less likely to grant judicial review than female 
judges and judges from the rest of Canada.99
D. Need for a Further Study
Because the Greene study examined all applications for leave in 
refugee cases filed in 1990, it provides compelling evidence that different 
judges were applying the leave requirement inconsistently. However, it is 
important to recall the context. The study examined leave decisions at a 
time when the leave requirement was a new and controversial procedure. 
It had only recently come into effect, and the criteria for granting leave had 
yet to be definitively established through case law. The strong association 
the study found between outcomes and judges could arguably be partly 
attributed to the novelty of the leave procedure.
The Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon study does suggest that such 
inconsistencies between judges persisted in 2003, long after the Federal 
Court had developed substantial experience with the leave requirement. 
That study also helpfully examines a variety of other factors that may affect 
outcomes—especially claimant demographics and legal representation. At 
the same time, however, the study has some methodological limitations, 
most notably problems related to sample size and to the representativeness 
of the samples, given that cases granted leave were oversampled. Also, 
97.  E-mail from Don Butler, reporter, Ottawa Citizen, to author (13 February 2012) (on 
file with author).
98.  Butler, supra note 95.
99.  Ibid. 
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the methodology of assessing the ideology of judges using a panel of 
experts is questionable. Judges who, in the experience of the panel, have 
more frequently denied applications are likely to be viewed as more 
“conservative” by such a panel, so what is actually being measured is 
not “ideology” but the judge’s past practice. Drawing conclusions about 
Francophone judges being more “skeptical” than their Anglophone 
counterparts is also problematic: how do we know, for example, whether 
these differences are attributable to the predilections of these two 
groups of judges or to patterns in the applications presented to the two 
groups? What if, for example, there is varying quality in terms of legal 
representation in Anglophone and Francophone communities—perhaps 
as a result of differing provincial legal aid policies in Quebec and Ontario?
Finally, the Butler study, while once again suggesting that variability 
across judges continues to be a concern, also has methodological 
limitations. Unlike the two earlier studies, Butler did not consult court 
files but examined online reasons for decisions. Because reasons are 
not typically provided for leave decisions, the study dealt only with 
decisions on the merits—and even then, only when reasons for decisions 
were issued, which, as noted above, is not always the case. Also, Butler 
calculated grant rates for individual judges based on small datasets, so the 
representativeness of the sample is questionable. Moreover, he did not 
consider whether there may be systemic factors that account to some 
extent for the variations in grant rates for judges from Quebec and the 
rest of Canada.100
III. The Present Study
In my view, a new study was needed on whether, after more than two 
decades of judicial experience with the leave requirement, the troubling 
variability so compellingly established in the Greene study persists. 
To overcome some of the methodological limitations of the two more 
recent studies discussed above, the new study had to be based on a large 
dataset that covered all refugee applications filed over a significant period 
of time; had to track outcomes at both the leave and merits stages; and 
100.  In addition to these methodological limitations, there are concerns about the accuracy 
of some of the data in the study. For instance, Barnes J’s political party of appointment was 
inaccurately reported, as was the number of cases he decided during the period of the study.
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had to look at the degree to which outcomes vary from judge to judge. 
This is the study I have undertaken. To get a more complete picture of 
recent decision making at the Federal Court in judicial reviews of refugee 
determinations, I have examined all Federal Court cases involving judicial 
review of IRB refugee determinations over several years—both leave 
decisions and decisions on the merits.
A. Methodology101
To gather the data for the study, a computer program102 was written 
to obtain information from the Federal Court’s online Court Index and 
Docket103 for all immigration applications filed from 2005 to 2010.104 The 
data gathered electronically includes: (1) court number; (2) style of cause; 
(3) date the application was filed; (4) office where the application was 
filed; and (5) the Court’s categorization of the type and nature of the 
proceeding. This produced a database of 40 334 applications.
Then, because the study is only interested in applications for judicial 
review of refugee determinations, cases were filtered out where the 
Federal Court categorized them as involving matters other than refugee 
determinations.105 It should be noted that a number of the cases categorized 
by the Federal Court as involving refugee determinations appeared to 
101.  I am grateful to Sarah L Boyd at Jackman and Associates for drawing my attention 
to this methodology.
102.  The programming involved coding macros in Microsoft Excel to import data from 
the online docket into a spreadsheet.
103.  Federal Court, “Court Files”, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
104.  The cases were identified using court numbers assigned by the Registrar. All 
immigration decisions were given a number in the format IMM-#-yy, where yy is the year 
the application was filed and # is the sequential order in which cases are filed in the year. 
The court numbers for the cases examined ranged from the first immigration application 
filed in 2005 (IMM-1-05) to the last immigration application filed in 2010 (IMM-7726-10).
105.  Cases were filtered out unless they were categorized in the online docket as: “Imm–
Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Refugee”. The other categories the Federal Court 
uses in the online docket are: “File cancelled—Immigration”; “Imm–Actions / Other 
(non-leave) proceedings”; "Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review—Arising outside Canada”; 
Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Immigration Division”; “Imm–Appl. for leave 
& jud. review–IRB—Refugee”; “Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review–IRB—Immigration 
Appeal Division”; “Imm–Appl. for leave & jud. review—Other Arising in Canada”; “Imm–
Appl. for leave & jud. review–Pre-removal risk assessment”; “Imm–Certificate”; “s. 18.1 
Application for Judicial Review” and “(blank)”.
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involve other matters (such as H&C applications and PRRAs). These 
cases were retained in the dataset.106 In other words, the dataset includes 
all applications from 2005 to 2010 that the Federal Court categorized as 
involving refugee determinations, whether or not that categorization was 
accurate. This produced a database of 23 047 applications.
The next step in the study was for research assistants to manually 
review online court dockets for each of the 23 047 applications categorized 
as involving a refugee determination. In this review, research assistants 
coded information about each application, including (where available): 
(1) whether the government was the applicant; (2) whether the application 
was perfected; (3) whether the respondent opposed leave; (4) leave judge; 
(5) leave outcome; (6) date of leave outcome; (7) JR judge; (8) judicial 
review outcome; and (9) date of judicial review outcome. In a few cases, 
the outcome was not clear from the online docket, or appeared to be 
wrongly recorded. For those cases, where reasons for decisions were 
available in online legal databases, the reasons were consulted. Where 
reasons for decisions were not available, copies of the relevant court 
orders were obtained from the Federal Court Registry.
At the same time, other research assistants gathered data about Federal 
Court judges from online sources, including biographies on the Federal 
Court’s website107 and Orders-in-Council on the Privy Council Office’s 
106.  The cases were retained because no means could be devised to exclude them 
consistently. Two problems arose in this regard. First, the dockets contained inconsistent 
levels of detail—some described the type of application, but most did not. It seemed 
problematic to exclude cases where there was enough detail to demonstrate erroneous 
categorization, when other cases were also likely to have been erroneously categorized 
but such errors were not visible in the dockets because less detail was provided. Second, 
early attempts to have research assistants code whether cases involved matters other 
than RPD decisions show that this required relatively complex judgment calls that were 
difficult to standardize, leading to inconsistent results across coders. For example, an early 
docket entry might indicate that the case involved an H&C application, but a subsequent 
docket might suggest that the case involved an RPD decision. How should such cases be 
categorized? In the end, retaining all the cases categorized by the registrar as involving RPD 
decisions seemed preferable to inconsistently excluding cases, especially because the size of 
the dataset meant that the inclusion of occasionally improperly categorized cases seemed 
unlikely to significantly impact the results of the study.
107.  Federal Court, Judges and Prothonotaries, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-
cf.gc.ca>.
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website.108 The data collected for each judge included: (1) gender; (2) date 
of appointment; and (3) political party of appointment.109
Data verification, including inter-coder checks, was undertaken to 
correct errors in coding throughout the process. When all the coding 
and data verification was complete, a random sample of 100 cases was 
reviewed, and no coding errors were detected in that review. It should be 
noted, however, that no attempt was made to measure the accuracy of the 
information in the online Federal Court dockets themselves.
B. Overview of the Dataset
Table 1 provides an overview of outcomes in the 23 047 applications 
considered in this study. A few points are worth noting.
First, applications for judicial review in refugee determinations 
rarely succeed. Indeed, only 6.35% of all applications for judicial review 
involving refugee determinations from 2005 to 2010 ultimately succeeded.
Second, given the low leave grant rate (14.44%), the success rate at the 
merits stage in cases where leave is granted (43.98%) is surprisingly high. 
Recall that the test for leave is supposed to be very permissive, namely, 
leave should be granted unless it is clear that there is no reasonable prospect 
that the application will succeed on the merits.110 If only applications 
that clearly cannot succeed on the merits fail at the leave stage, and if 
the vast majority of applications do not pass that stage, one might expect 
success rates on the merits to be lower in cases where leave is granted. 
The combination of low leave-granting rates and high success rates once 
108.  Privy Council Office, Orders in Council Database, online: Privy Council Office 
<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>.
109.  Political party of appointment was calculated based on the political party of the 
Prime Minister on the date of first appointment to the federal courts. Some judges had 
previously been appointed to other courts (including courts where judges are federally 
appointed), but those prior appointments were not used for the purpose of determining 
political party of appointment.
110.  See text accompanying notes 31–41.
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leave is granted may lead one to wonder whether leave is too often being 
withheld in cases where there is some modest prospect of success.111
Third, the vast majority of applications (99.42%) are made by claimants 
seeking to challenge negative refugee determinations, rather than by the 
Minister seeking to challenge positive refugee determinations. When the 
Minister does bring an application, however, it is much more likely to 
succeed. Applications by the Minister are 4.14 times as likely to be granted 
leave (58.65%) than are applications brought by unsuccessful refugee 
claimants (14.18%). While applications brought by the Minister are also 
more likely to succeed on judicial review after leave has been granted 
(62.82%) than applications brought by unsuccessful refugee claimants 
(43.53%), the difference is not as pronounced (1.44 times as likely to 
succeed). Still, overall, applications brought by the Minister from 2005 to 
2010 were ultimately successful in overturning the refugee determination 
36.84% of the time, whereas the equivalent figure for applications brought 
by unsuccessful claimants was only 6.18%.
Fourth, it is apparent that many applications for leave are never 
considered on their merits. For example, a significant proportion of 
applications (20.24%) are denied leave without having been perfected. This 
means that the applicant in those cases—almost always an unsuccessful 
refugee claimant—did not file an application record justifying the 
application, so the application was rejected without being considered 
by the leave judge. Similarly, in a few cases (2.15%) the application was 
withdrawn by the applicant before a leave decision was made, which again 
means that the application was never considered by a judge.112
111.  Some might respond that this reasoning presumes a normal distribution of likelihood 
of success across cases, whereas likelihood of success may in fact follow some other pattern. 
For example, even setting aside unperfected cases, perhaps there is a large proportion of 
clearly unfounded claims and a significant proportion of claims which have a good prospect 
of success, with very few in between. In such circumstances, low leave rates combined 
with high success rates in cases where leave is granted would not be unexpected. In my 
view, however, the findings reflected in Table 2 suggest that there are a large number 
of borderline cases—that is to say, cases where some judges would deny leave on the 
basis of no reasonable prospect of success, while others would disagree and grant leave. 
If such borderline cases were consistently granted leave, leave rates would be higher and 
(presumably) success rates on the merits where leave is granted would be lower.
112.  The frequency of unperfected applications raises a question for future research: are 
the rates at which applications are unperfected or withdrawn influenced by whether the 
applicant had legal representation?
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Finally, leave was granted unopposed in a small number of cases 
(1.81%), meaning that the respondent (usually the Minister) consented 
to the application, or indicated no opposition to leave being granted, 
or simply failed to file a memorandum of argument opposing leave. It 
should be noted that in a handful of cases, leave was denied despite the 
lack of opposition by the respondent.113 In some cases, judicial review 
was granted at the merits stage on consent (9.22% of cases where leave 
was granted). Also, in some cases, the application was withdrawn after 
leave was given (4.27% of cases where leave was given)—although it is not 
clear that this means the application necessarily failed. For example, the 
application may have been withdrawn because the applicant was granted 
permanent residence in Canada through other immigration procedures, 
such as an H&C application.
Because the present study is mainly interested in how the leave 
requirement operates and whether outcomes vary from judge to judge, 
the remainder of the data presented focuses only on perfected applications 
(because all judges will similarly deny unperfected applications), on 
applications where the judge deciding the case is identified (which 
eliminates cases withdrawn before the leave determination and a few 
cases where the name of the judge was not indicated in the online court 
docket), and on applications brought by unsuccessful refugee claimants 
(because applications brought by the Minister are exceptional, and raise a 
different set of issues than applications brought by claimants).
C. Grant Rates for Leave Judges
The most remarkable finding of the study is the enormous variation in 
the leave grant rates of judges in perfected applications brought by refugee 
claimants, which can be seen in Table 2. For example, Campbell J granted 
leave in 77.97% of the applications he decided, whereas Crampton J (now 
the Chief Justice) granted leave only 1.36% of the time. In other words, 
113.  See e.g. Bibi v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (10 October 2006), IMM-
4043-06, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Vasquez et al v Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration (07 April 2005), IMM-687-05, online: Federal Court <http://
www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Mazunder v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (07 April 2005), 
IMM-3059-05, online: Federal Court <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca>; Rochester v Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration (26 July 2005), IMM-3062-05, online: Federal Court <http://
www.fct-cf.gc.ca>.
(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ26
though both judges decided over 200 applications, refugee claimants were 
an incredible 57.33 times as likely to obtain leave from Campbell J as from 
Crampton J. It should be noted that Campbell J was clearly an outlier, 
with a leave grant rate 2.31 times as high as anyone else (Shore J was 
second at 33.71%). Nonetheless, 20 judges had leave grant rates more than 
ten times as high as Crampton J, and six had rates more than ten times as 
high as Near J (2.50%), who had the second lowest leave grant rate.
In addition to the surprisingly large variations in leave grant rates 
between judges, it should also be noted that those rates follow a largely 
linear distribution (for the shape of the distribution, see Chart 1). Rather 
than most judges having leave grant rates near the average of 16.38% and 
only a few judges deviating substantially from that mean (which would be 
a standard distribution), a substantial proportion had rates that departed 
significantly from the average. Indeed, 36% of judges deviated by more 
than 50% from the average.114
Another key finding of the study is that the identity of the leave judge 
has a strong effect on the likelihood that an application will ultimately 
succeed (that the first instance refugee determination will be overturned 
on judicial review). Thus, for example, in 21.43% of the cases where 
Campbell J decided the leave applications, the refugee determination 
was ultimately overturned by the Federal Court, whereas the equivalent 
figure for Near J was 2.45%. Similarly, when Russell J was the leave judge, 
15.60% of applications ultimately succeeded, but for Noël J the equivalent 
figure was only 2.97%. In fact, when the judge deciding leave was among 
those with the ten highest grant rates (deciding 50 or more applications), 
the ultimate success rate was 12.19%, while for those with the ten lowest 
grant rates, the ultimate success rate was 3.38%. In other words, applicants 
were 3.61 times as likely to succeed in overturning a first-instance refugee 
decision when leave was decided by a judge whose leave grant rate was in 
the top ten than when it was decided by one in the bottom ten.
Interestingly, although applicants generally did better when their 
applications were assigned to judges with higher leave grant rates, this 
114.  Treating a deviation of more than 50% from the average as a criterion for identifying 
outliers in judicial decision making has been described in other studies as a “very tolerant 
standard of consistency” that some might argue “tolerates too much deviation”. See Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I Schoenholtz & Philip G Schrag, “Refugee Roulette: Disparities 
in Asylum Adjudication” (2007) 60:2 Stan L Rev 295 at 312–13.
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was not always the case. For instance, Shore J’s leave grant rate (33.71%) 
was 3.67 times as high as Layden-Stevenson J’s (9.22%), but an applicant 
was actually more likely to succeed in overturning a first-instance 
refugee determination when Layden-Stevenson J decided leave (11.91%) 
than when Shore J decided leave (9.33%). Similarly, even though Zinn J 
(20.57%) was almost twice as likely to grant leave as Gibson J (10.81%), 
an application was slightly more likely to succeed when Gibson J was the 
leave judge (9.71%) than when Zinn J was the leave judge (8.47%). Some 
leave judges would therefore appear to be better than others at picking 
cases that will ultimately succeed on the merits.
D. Grant Rates for Judicial Review Judges
As can be seen in Table 3, there are also massive disparities in grant 
rates among judges who decide applications on the merits, after leave 
has been granted. In other words, the identity of the JR judge is also a 
key factor in the ultimate success of an application for judicial review 
(although it is, of course, a factor that only comes into play in the 
relatively few applications that succeed at the leave stage). Some JR judges 
grant judicial review on the merits in most of the applications they decide, 
such as Campbell J (92.31%) and Hansen J (72.97%). Others do so much 
less frequently, including Boivin J (7.89%) and Blais J (13.33%).
Some of the judges who are outliers when deciding leave are also outliers 
when they serve as JR judges deciding cases on their merits. This includes, 
at the high end, Campbell J (leave: 77.97%; JR: 92.31%) and O’Keefe J 
(leave: 25.91%; JR: 66.32%), and at the low end, Crampton J (leave: 1.36%; 
JR: 18.60%) and Boivin J (leave: 6.47%; JR 7.89%). Interestingly, however, 
this is not always the case. For example, Shore J has an unusually high 
leave grant rate (33.71%), and a below-average JR grant rate (33.81%). 
Similarly, Harrington J has an unusually low leave grant rate (6.18%), but 
only a slightly below-average JR grant rate (35.96%).
E. Judge Demographics
Table 4 breaks down results in applications, at both the leave stage and 
the JR stage, based on demographic characteristics of the deciding judge at 
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each stage. Specifically, it shows grant rates broken down by the political 
party that appointed the judge and by his or her gender.
There are differences, at both stages, between the grant rates of male 
and female judges, with male leave judges slightly more likely to grant 
leave (16.52%) as compared to female leave judges (15.85%), and female 
JR judges somewhat more likely to grant JR on the merits (42.88%) as 
compared to male JR judges (38.78%).115 However, these differences are 
quite small—and it has to be kept in mind that the average grant rates 
are sensitive to outliers. For example, if Campbell J’s leave decisions are 
taken out of the analysis, the leave grant rates for male leave judges drops 
to 15.48%.
There are more substantial differences, again at both the leave stage 
and the JR stage, between grant rates of judges appointed by Liberal 
Party prime ministers (Liberal PMs) and by Progressive Conservative 
and Conservative Party prime ministers (Conservative PMs). Leave 
judges appointed by Liberal PMs were 1.60 times as likely to grant 
leave (17.64%) than their counterparts appointed by Conservative PMs 
(11.00%). Similarly, in cases where leave was granted, JR judges appointed 
by Liberal PMs were 1.46 times as likely to grant judicial review on the 
merits (42.69%) than JR judges appointed by Conservative PMs (29.14%). 
It should be noted, however, that variations in grant rates among 
individual judges appointed by PMs from the same political party were 
more pronounced than variations between judges appointed by PMs from 
different parties. For example, the leave grant rates of Blais J (3.10%), 
Harrington J (6.18%), Shore J (33.71%) and Campbell J (77.97%) vary 
enormously even though they were all appointed by Liberal PMs.
F. Factors Accounting for Variability
While the variations in grant rates between judges are very large, a 
number of factors might partly account for these variations. For example, 
applications brought in one part of the country may be better founded 
than applications brought in other areas, so judges deciding applications 
from different parts of the country might justifiably have different grant 
115.  It should also be noted that the Federal Court bench has not yet achieved gender 
parity. As Table 4 shows, 78.01% of perfected applications for leave were decided by male 
leave judges, and 81.59% of cases decided on the merits were heard by male JR judges.
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rates. This might happen if there were differences in the quality of legal 
representation in various cities (maybe because of varying legal aid 
policies), or if first-instance decision-makers at the RPD in different cities 
were more or less likely to make reviewable errors.
As can be seen in Table 5, the city where an application is filed does 
seem to make an important difference (though the table does not explain 
why this would be the case). Most applications (92.93%) are filed in either 
Toronto or Montreal. Applicants were 1.42 times as likely to get leave in 
Toronto (17.73%) as in Montreal (12.52%). Similarly, in cases where leave 
was granted, applicants were 1.78 times as likely to succeed on the merits 
in Toronto (45.01%) as in Montreal (25.33%).
However, as Table 6 indicates, even when one looks at applications 
filed in only one city, variations in grant rates across judges remain. 
For example, in applications filed in Toronto, Finckenstein J (1.27%), 
Crampton J (1.64%) and Near J (2.17%) granted leave very infrequently, 
whereas Campbell J (78.61%), Shore J (41.22%) and Bedard J (36.36%) 
were much more likely to grant leave. It would therefore appear that 
the city where the application was filed cannot account for the massive 
variations in grant rates across judges.
Another factor that could potentially explain part of the variation 
in grant rates is the point in time when an application was filed. For 
example, over time, first-instance RPD decision makers might be more 
or less likely to commit reviewable errors. Or major changes in the law 
might have made the Federal Court more or less deferential toward 
administrative tribunals. During the period of the study, the Supreme 
Court decision in Dunsmuir significantly modified standards of review in 
administrative law,116 so it may be that judges deciding cases mostly before 
or mostly after that decision would have different grant rates.
Table 7, however, shows that there is no consistent trend in grant 
rates—at either the leave or merits stages—over the period of the study. It 
would, therefore, seem that the point in time when a judge made his or 
her decisions does not account for variations in grant rates found in the 
study.
Table 8 provides further support for this conclusion. JR grant rates 
in cases where leave was granted were somewhat higher in applications 
filed before Dunsmuir (42.42%) than after (36.14%). But leave grant 
116.  Supra note 45.
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rates actually increased slightly (from 16.08% to 16.73%) in the period 
after Dunsmuir. These competing trends suggest that Dunsmuir likely 
did not have a straightforward or significant impact on the outcomes of 
applications. 
We can thus reject the hypothesis that variations in grant rates can be 
explained by whether a judge decided most of his or her cases before or 
after Dunsmuir.
It appears, then, that neither the time nor location of the judicial review 
application accounts for the extreme variability in leave and JR grant 
rates across judges. Moreover, recall that cases are randomly assigned to 
leave judges without being screened on the merits by the registrar.117 This 
means that, at least as between leave judges who decided large numbers 
of cases, it is unlikely that other factors which may affect the likelihood 
of success on individual applications (such as the identity of the RPD 
first-instance decision-maker or the quality of particular counsel) could 
account for variations in the rate at which those judges granted leave.
IV. Discussion
The central finding of the study is that leave decisions hinge partly 
on which judge is assigned to decide the application. There were massive 
unexplained variations in leave grant rates; at the extremes, one particular 
judge was 50 times as likely to grant leave as another particular judge. It 
seems clear that some applications which could well succeed before most 
JR judges are prevented from reaching the merits stage by the fact that 
some leave judges are predisposed to deny leave. This is deeply troubling 
in light of the fact that leave decisions are the determinative step in the 
vast majority of applications (only 14.18% of applications get leave), and 
the fact that a large proportion of applications that pass the leave stage end 
up succeeding on the merits (43.98%), even though the leave requirement 
is supposed to screen out only clearly unfounded applications. Moreover, 
it should be recalled that leave determinations involve a process that 
is both opaque (in that reasons are not usually provided when leave is 
denied) and final (in that there is no appeal from a leave determination). 
And, of course, there are extreme stakes in this decision-making process: 
117.  See Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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if the Federal Court wrongly denies applications, the direct result is that 
refugees may, contrary to international refugee law, be sent back to 
countries where they face persecution, torture or death. In short, the key 
finding of the study is that the leave requirement, as currently applied, 
all too often poses an arbitrary and unfair barrier to access to justice for 
refugees, with potentially devastating consequences.
Before moving on to the policy implications of that central finding, 
three other findings of the study are worth highlighting.
First, there is dramatic variability in grant rates among JR judges at the 
merits stage—from a minimum of 7.89% to a maximum of 92.31%. This 
variability demonstrates a remarkable lack of consensus on refugee law at 
the Federal Court.118 To be sure, variability in grant rates at the merits stage 
has less of an impact on most claimants than variability at the leave stage, 
because most applications never reach the merits stage. Nonetheless, it is 
worth thinking further about whether the structure of judicial review in 
refugee matters needs to be revised to bring more consistency to decisions 
on the merits. In particular, one wonders whether restrictions on appeal 
rights in cases decided on the merits should be reconsidered. As noted 
earlier, a decision on the merits can only be appealed to the Federal Court 
of Appeal if the JR judge issuing that decision certifies a question for 
appeal. Perhaps consistency in decision making on the merits would be 
enhanced if, rather than a certification requirement, there was an appeal 
as of right or with leave of the Federal Court of Appeal.119
Second, the study shows that although an adjudicator’s gender 
appeared to have some effect on outcomes, that effect was not consistent 
or straightforward: male judges were slightly more likely than female 
judges to grant leave, but less likely to grant judicial review on the merits. 
Moreover, the effects of a judge’s gender are quite small. This finding is 
interesting, in part because a large-scale study of refugee determinations 
in the US found that adjudicator gender has a surprisingly large impact 
118.  This is not a new phenomenon. For an analysis of the lack of consistency in the 
application of refugee law by the Federal Court in the early 1990s, see Mary C Hurley, 
“Principles, Practices, Fragile Promises: Judicial Review of Refugee Determination 
Decisions Before the Federal Court of Canada” (1996) 41:2 McGill LJ 317.
119.  For further discussion of the certification requirement, see Gerald P Heckman, 
“Unfinished Business: Baker and the Constitutionality of the Leave and Certification 
Requirements under the Immigration Act” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 683 [Heckman, “Baker”]; 
Hurley, supra note 118.
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on outcomes, with male immigration judges much less sympathetic to 
applicants than female immigration judges.120 This finding suggests that 
one must be cautious about inferring differences in how men and women 
engage in judging or moral reasoning from studies that find gender 
difference in specific adjudicative settings. Such reasoning must explain 
why these differences are not apparent in other contexts.121
Third, the study indicates that judges appointed by Liberal PMs 
are more likely to grant leave and to grant judicial review than judges 
appointed by Conservative PMs—though there was much more variation 
between individual judges appointed by PMs from either party than 
between the two groups. This finding is, of course, not surprising. The 
current Conservative government has clearly indicated a desire for 
increased deference from the Federal Court on immigration and refugee 
matters. In fact, the current Minister, Jason Kenney, recently chided the 
Federal Court in these terms: “[S]eemingly on a whim, or perhaps in a 
fit of misguided magnanimity, a judge overturns the careful decisions of 
multiple levels of diligent, highly trained public servants, tribunals, and 
even other judges. . . . [S]uch decisions do serious harm to the overall 
immigration system and prevent it from doing more good for deserving 
immigrants. And they undermine public confidence in the government’s 
ability to enforce our laws as passed by Parliament, and therefore 
in the entire system. . . . We’ve made some necessary changes to the 
system . . . [b]ut we legislators are not an island, and we don’t act alone. 
We need the judiciary to understand the spirit of what we are trying to 
do”.122
In light of such comments, it seems unremarkable that Conservative 
PMs might seek to appoint judges who are seen as likely to share their 
policy preferences, and in particular are more likely to defer to refugee 
120.  Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag supra note 114 at 342ff.
121.  For a further discussion of gender and adjudication in the refugee context, and 
the danger of generalizing from findings of gender differences in adjudication in specific 
settings, see Rehaag, “Gender”, supra note 15.
122.  (Address delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 11 
February 2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada Media Centre <http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media>.
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decisions made by the IRB.123 Still, once appointed, judges are independent, 
and they typically understand their role not as making policy choices 
but as fairly applying the law to the best of their ability, so their actual 
behaviour on the bench may be difficult to predict in advance. Indeed, 
the Minister’s comments turned out to be highly controversial, in part 
because they showed little respect for judicial independence. As Audrey 
Macklin and Lorne Waldman put it:
[J]udges are supposed to be independent of government, and government is supposed to 
respect that independence. The executive appoints our judges. But once they’re appointed, 
our democracy requires that they render their decisions free from government influence 
or pressure. . . . When Mr. Kenney publicly criticizes judges for interpreting the law in a 
manner that diverges from his own preferred outcome, he shows contempt for judicial 
independence.124
There is an important caution that one should take away from this. While 
the present study shows that inconsistent decision making in judicial 
review of refugee determinations is a serious problem, any attempt to deal 
with these inconsistencies needs to be respectful of judicial independence. 
For this reason it would in my view be a mistake to focus too heavily 
on the fact that judges appointed by different political parties may, on 
average, be more or less likely to decide in favour of applicants (especially 
given the variations between judges appointed by a particular political 
party). Absent exceptional circumstances, we should generally resist the 
temptation to argue that judges whose grant rates are higher or lower 
than average provoke a reasonable apprehension of bias and should recuse 
themselves from hearing applications for judicial review in the refugee 
123.  Many would argue that this is a perfectly legitimate feature of representative 
democracy. See e.g. Macdonald & Scott, supra note 62 (“[o]nce a candidate has been 
certified as competent by the expert selection committee, it is not offensive to democratic 
constitutional theory for governments to appoint judges who are on the same general 
policy page as they are” at 38).
124.  “When cabinet ministers attack judges, they attack democracy” The Globe and Mail 
(18 February 2011) A17, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.
com>. See also Letter from Rod Snow, President of the Canadian Bar Association, to 
Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism (22 February 
2011), online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org>; Richard Foot, “Chief 
Justice supports criticism of Kenney”, National Post (13 August 2011), online: National 
Post <http://www.nationalpost.com>.
(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ34
law context, or that their decisions should be overturned on this basis.125 
Instead, we should focus on whether there are institutional impediments 
to consistent decision making in this area of judicial review—and if so, 
what might be done about it. I will now turn to a discussion of possible 
reforms to address these concerns.
A. Abolishing the Leave Requirement
Perhaps the most obvious way to reduce arbitrary limits on access to 
justice for refugees would be to abolish the leave requirement.
This requirement has been controversial since it was first introduced in 
1987 as part of a package of reforms to the refugee determination process.126 
Part of the reason for the controversy is that the leave requirement was 
(and is) an unprecedented limit on access to first-instance judicial review 
of administrative decision making in Canada. William Angus, then at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, testified before a parliamentary committee 
considering proposed legislation that included the leave requirement, and 
offered the following assessment:
I come finally to . . . the limitations placed on access to the courts. . . . I think that the 
courts are going to look very closely at these provisions and that Parliament, if these 
provisions pass in their present form, is not going to get away with it. . . .
125.  Courts have regularly held that statistical differences in outcomes are not sufficient 
on their own to ground a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias. See e.g. Es-Sayyid v 
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FCA 59, 432 NR 261; 
Jaroslav v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 634 at paras 53–57, 390 
FTR 248; Dunova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 438, [2010] 
FCJ No 511 (QL); Zrig v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1043 
at para 130, [2002] 1 FC 559. Judicial reluctance to find reasonable apprehension of bias 
based on mere statistics is understandable. However there are, in my view, exceptional 
circumstances where statistical evidence is so overwhelming that it meets the test for a 
reasonable apprehension of bias. See e.g. Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 
at para 60, [2003] 2 SCR 259. This might be the case where, for example, reliable evidence 
shows that a judge never—or almost never—grants particular types of applications, despite 
having decided a large number of them, and that other judges frequently grant those types 
of applications.
126.  An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976, 2nd Sess, 33rd Parl, 1987, s 19 (assented 
to 21 July 1988). For a discussion of the broader revisions to the refugee determination 
system, see Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Determination of Refugee Status in 
Canada: A Review of the Procedure (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1992).
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I have not seen—there may be a precedent somewhere, but I have not seen it, and I think 
it is unprecedented—a situation where access to the courts, not by way of an appeal, which 
you only get by statute, but by way of judicial review. . . . I have not seen where the time-
honoured, traditional remedies that have been present for centuries are limited whereby 
you have to get leave of a judge even to have your access to the traditional prerogative 
writs. . . . This is [a] most extraordinary provision, which might be appropriate for an 
authoritarian state, but is completely inappropriate for a democracy such as we have in 
Canada, in which we have a system for the rule of law.127
Others disagreed. John Frecker, then a commissioner at the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, said to the same parliamentary committee:
[T]he pattern that is emerging—and it is as much of a trend problem as a gross caseload 
problem at this instant—in the immigration appeal area is that the court could be choked. 
One way the court can control that is by having a requirement that application to the 
court in the problem area . . . be by leave. . . . The question is does the court have, as a 
matter of fairness, to hear every appeal that is put to it? My answer [is] that there is no 
principle in law that says that a court has to, as a matter of fairness, hear every appeal from 
an administrative tribunal.128
The proponents of a leave requirement won the day, and the requirement 
was brought into effect in 1989.129 However, the controversy did not end 
there.
Greene, relying on his empirical study of all leave decisions involving 
refugee matters in 1990, concluded that the leave requirement imposed 
arbitrary limits on access to judicial review: “applicants for leave . . . are 
denied fundamental justice . . . because they do not have an equal 
chance of convincing the judge that their application for leave ought to 
be granted”.130A few years later, Mary Hurley, in an article offering a 
qualitative assessment of inconsistencies in early Federal Court refugee 
jurisprudence, called the leave requirement “a genuine refugee’s black 
127.  House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee 
on Bill C-55, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, (4 September 1987) at 7:11.
128.  House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee 
on Bill C-55, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, (8 September 1987) at 8:155–56.
129.  For a discussion of the introduction of the leave requirement and its institutional 
development during the 1990s, see Hurley, supra note 118 at 332–36.
130.  Greene & Shaffer, supra note 27 at 82.
(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ36
hole”131 and “a lottery-like process”.132 More recently, Gould, Sheppard 
and Wheeldon’s study of Federal Court decisions made in 2003—including 
leave decisions—echoed Greene’s results, finding that outcomes were 
influenced by “a number of extra legal, indeed inappropriate, factors”, 
and concluding that “the Canadian system of immigration and refugee 
determination has significant flaws”.133
The present study further confirms these findings, this time with 
a large dataset that covers the full Federal Court refugee law caseload 
over a five-year period. When preliminary results of this study were first 
released, Lorne Waldman and Audrey Macklin suggested that they raised 
serious concerns about the arbitrary application of the leave requirement:
[P]ublic confidence in the courts depends in part on our faith that judges make principled 
and reasoned decisions. The adage that justice not only be done, but seen to be done, 
underscores the importance of transparency in maintaining that confidence. The leave 
process is the opposite of transparent: apart from the requirement that the refugee 
claimant present an ‘arguable case’, there are no criteria, no process, and judges never issue 
reasons for refusing leave. No one except the judges knows what makes a case worthy of 
being heard, and the enormous statistical variation among judges suggests that they don’t 
agree among themselves anyway. Arbitrariness—even the appearance of arbitrariness—is 
antithetical to fairness. Access to justice for refugee claimants should not look like a lottery. 
It does a disservice to refugee claimants and, to the extent that it undermines confidence in 
the judiciary, does a disservice to the judiciary, too.134
It seems, then, that over the more than 20 years that the leave requirement 
has been in effect, no consistent practice has developed which would 
adequately address the critique that the process creates arbitrary limits 
on access to the court for refugees—a critique that has been repeatedly 
substantiated by empirical studies. It may simply be time to abolish the 
leave requirement.135
131.  Supra note 118 at 363.
132.  Ibid at 364.
133.  Greene, supra note 27 at 482.
134.  “Access to justice should not look like a lottery”, The Ottawa Citizen (29 November 
2011) A13, online: Ottawa Citizen <http://www.ottawacitizen.com>.
135.  It should be noted that abolishing the leave requirement would not necessarily mean 
that frivolous applications for judicial review would proceed to a hearing, as procedures are 
available in the Federal Court for summary disposition of clearly unfounded applications, 
including motions to strike. See Federal Courts Rules, supra note 29, s 221.
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Abolishing the leave requirement would have significant resource 
implications. The complement of Federal Court judges would need to be 
substantially expanded in order to hold a much larger number of hearings 
on the merits for applications for judicial review of refugee determinations 
in a timely manner. In addition, expenses for counsel would likely increase, 
both for the Department of Justice and for provincial legal aid programs. 
However, the same could be said about other changes that have improved 
the fairness of Canada’s refugee determination system. For example, it 
was clear that the Supreme Court’s decision in Singh v Canada (Minister 
of Empoyment and Immigration),136 which mandated oral hearings in 
refugee claims where credibility was at stake, would have similar kinds of 
resource implications, yet the Court did not hesitate to find that fairness 
in life-and-death decision-making processes should not be compromised 
by those considerations.137
Unfortunately, given the current Conservative government’s focus 
on expediting the refugee determination process, it is highly unlikely 
that the leave requirement will be abolished through legislation in the 
near future.138 As a result, the only way to remove it would be through 
constitutional litigation.
A constitutional challenge would, however, confront a number 
of hurdles. Most notably, the leave requirement has survived past 
constitutional challenges. The leading and oft-cited case is Bains.139 In 
this five-paragraph decision from 1990, the Federal Court of Appeal 
set out the test for when leave should be granted, and noted that it was 
essentially the same as the test applied on a motion to strike (namely, that 
there was “no reasonably arguable case”).140 The Court then considered 
the constitutionality of the leave provision: “The requirement of leave 
does not deny refugee claimants access to the Court. The right to apply 
for leave is itself a right of access to the Court and, in our opinion, the 
requirement that leave be obtained before an appeal or application for 
judicial review may proceed does not impair rights guaranteed refugee 
136.  Supra note 5.
137.  Ibid at 218–21.
138.  See supra notes 127–29 (and accompanying text).
139.  Bains, supra note 31.
140.  Ibid at para 3.
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claimants under either s. 7 or s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”.141
The Federal Court of Appeal revisited the matter in 2001 in Krishnapillai 
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a case which involved 
an appeal of a successful motion to strike a statement of claim challenging 
the constitutionality of the leave requirement.142 In that case, the Court 
held that the matter had already been largely decided in Bains.143 The only 
constitutional issue that it found had not already been explicitly resolved 
in Bains was whether the “failure to impose an obligation to give reasons 
when denying leave” was unconstitutional.144 The Court’s reasons were 
succinct: “That neither the Court nor counsel seemed to be concerned 
with [the] practice [of denying leave without giving reasons] is hardly 
surprising. It was then settled law that judicial decisions are not subject to 
the requirement of giving formal reasons and in my view nothing which 
was said in Baker at paragraph 35 ff. with respect to the requirement that 
in certain circumstances reasons be provided for administrative decisions, 
leads to the import of such a requirement with respect to judicial decisions 
denying leave to seek judicial review. The attack on the constitutionality 
of the leave requirement prescribed by section 82.1 of the Immigration 
Act has no chance of success”.145
These brief passages from Bains and Krishnapillai, which constitute 
the totality of the jurisprudence on the subject, hardly represent a full 
judicial analysis of the constitutionality of the leave requirement. The 
more recent of these two cases is more than ten years old, and the Supreme 
Court has never decided the issue. In addition, even assuming that Bains 
and Krishnapillai are still correct and that the leave requirement does not, 
in principle, violate constitutional norms, an argument can be made that 
the arbitrary application of the leave requirement by the Federal Court 
does violate constitutional norms, and in particular, the right not to be 
deprived of life, liberty or security of the person except in accordance 
141.  Ibid at para 4.
142.  [2002] 3 FC 74 at para 24ff, 2001 FCA 378. 
143.  Ibid.
144.  The Court did look, in somewhat more detail (i.e. 13 paragraphs), at the question of 
whether the leave requirement complies with international refugee law. The Court found 
that it did. (ibid at paras 20–33).
145.  Ibid at paras 35–36 [footnotes omitted].
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with a process that complies with the principles of fundamental justice.146 
In my view, advocates for refugees should seriously consider a new 
constitutional challenge to the leave requirement, given the importance 
of the matter to both individual refugee claimants and to Canada’s refugee 
determination process, the brevity and age of the existing jurisprudence 
and the substantial empirical evidence that the Federal Court has been 
applying the leave requirement arbitrarily.147
B. Reforming the Leave Requirement
In the alternative, if the leave requirement is not abolished, there are 
institutional reforms that would be worth considering in order to enhance 
consistency in leave decisions.
One such reform would be for leave judges to issue reasons when denying 
leave. This would have at least three advantages. First, it would enhance 
transparency and would assure parties that their arguments had been fully 
considered.148 Second, it would establish an extensive jurisprudence on 
when leave should be denied, allowing more comprehensive and coherent 
146.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. There are many different 
directions that such a fundamental justice argument could take, and it is beyond the scope 
of this article to explore those in detail.
147.  In addition to litigation surrounding constitutional due process norms, it would 
be worth considering constitutional equality norms and international norms on access 
to independent courts. For excellent discussions, see Heckman, “Baker”, supra note 119; 
Gerald P Heckman, Prospects for Narrowing the Gap Between Domestic and International 
Institutional and Procedural Safeguards in Canadian, American and Australian Refugee 
Protection Decisionmaking (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2008) [unpublished]; 
Gerald P Heckman, “Canada’s Refugee Status Determination System and the International 
Norm of Independence” (2009) 25:2 Refuge 79.
148.  R v REM, 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 SCR 3, (“[r]easons tell the parties affected by the 
decision why the decision was made [ . . . and reasons] provide accountability of the judicial 
decision; justice is not only done, but is seen to be done” at para 11). See also Lon L Fuller, 
“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353 (“[b]y and large it 
seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned 
opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation 
in the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account 
their proofs and arguments” at 388).
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standards to be developed through precedent.149 Third, the act of writing 
reasons itself can enhance consistency by disciplining judicial reasoning.150 
However, giving reasons would only serve those purposes if the 
reasons engaged meaningfully with the arguments presented by the 
applicant and the respondent. Because the Court must decide a very large 
number of leave applications, and because some leave judges may doubt 
the utility of reasons where there is no appeal, there is a real risk that only 
cursory reasons would be given. It is also questionable whether limited 
resources should be put into issuing thousands of reasons for denying 
leave each year, rather than putting those same resources into deciding 
more applications on the merits.
A more promising option for institutional reform would be to have 
leave decisions made by more than one judge. This could take at least 
two forms. First, leave could be decided by panels of two judges, either of 
whom could grant leave but both of whom would need to agree in order 
to deny leave—if one judge thought that there was a reasonably arguable 
case, the applicant should not be denied the right to proceed to a full 
hearing, because it would not be clear and obvious that the application had 
no prospect of success. Having two judges make leave decisions together 
on a panel would not only enhance consistency by reducing the number 
of applications where leave is denied because of the predispositions of a 
single judge, but it would also provide regular forums for Federal Court 
judges to discuss and develop shared understandings about when leave 
should be granted.151
Alternatively, an additional judge could reconsider an application for 
leave, but only where the first leave judge denied leave. Therefore, once 
again, one judge alone could grant leave but it would take two judges to 
deny leave. In this model, the second judge could approach the application 
for leave on a de novo basis—ideally without knowing that it had already 
149.  See R v REM, supra note 148 (“reasons are a fundamental means of developing the 
law uniformly, by providing guidance to future courts in accordance with the principle of 
stare decisis” at para 12).
150.  Ibid (“reasons help ensure fair and accurate decision making; the task of articulating 
the reasons directs the judge’s attention to the salient issues and lessens the possibility of 
overlooking or under-emphasizing important points of fact or law”).
151.  For an argument that dialogue among judges with multiple perspectives can improve 
judicial decision making, see Jennifer Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges 
to Law” (1997) 42:1 McGill LJ 91.
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been considered by a first judge. This reform could be undertaken as 
either a permanent policy or a pilot project. If it was a pilot project, 
data could be gathered by the Federal Court about how often leave was 
granted by a second judge, and how often applications where leave was 
granted by a second judge went on to succeed on the merits. If it turned 
out that few applications succeeded on the merits after leave had been 
denied by a first leave judge and granted by a second one, the court could 
discontinue the pilot project. If, on the other hand, a significant number 
of such applications did succeed on the merits, the pilot project would be 
continued.152
Both of these institutional reforms would require additional resources 
for the Federal Court. The second of the above reforms has the advantage, 
however, that review of an application by a second judge would not be 
needed unless the first judge had denied leave. Moreover, if the second 
reform was run as a pilot project, it would only need to continue for so 
long as the evidence established that it was necessary in order to enhance 
consistency in leave determinations. If the Federal Court eventually 
developed more consistent practices, the pilot project could be abandoned, 
which would facilitate evidence-based resource allocation.
C. Clarifying the Test for Leave
As explained above, the test for when leave should be granted is whether 
the applicant has made out a reasonably arguable case—or, inversely, 
whether it is clear and obvious that the application has no prospect of 
success.153 However, this study shows that there is little consensus in the 
Federal Court on how to actually apply the test. Therefore, even in the 
absence of any major reform of the process for applying for leave, the test 
for granting leave should be clarified to give leave judges more guidance, 
which would hopefully reduce inconsistent decision making.
152.  I am grateful for the helpful suggestions on this proposed pilot project offered by 
Audrey Macklin, Hadayt Nazami, Barbara Jackman, Andrew Brouwer, Lorne Waldman, 
Mitchell Goldberg, Donald Galloway, Pia Zambelli and Aviva Basman. I hasten to add that 
by listing them here I do not mean to suggest that they necessarily agree with the proposed 
pilot project as I have outlined it.
153.  See text accompanying notes 31–41.
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It would be particularly helpful, in my view, if appellate courts were to 
offer an extended analysis of the test for leave. Any such analysis should 
be attentive to the following considerations:154
 •  Judicial review in refugee law engages constitutional rights to life, 
liberty and security of the person;
 •  if the court gets a decision wrong, a refugee may be deported to face 
persecution, torture or death;
 •  the process must therefore comply with the principles of 
fundamental justice, and judges deciding leave should keep these 
stakes foremost in mind; and
 •  the leave requirement should not be used as an instrument of docket 
control.
Applicants for refugee status are entitled to full hearings on the merits, 
except where a full hearing would serve no useful purpose because an 
application is so clearly without merit that it has no reasonable prospect 
of success. The mere fact that an application is likely—or even very 
likely—to fail on the merits is not sufficient reason to deny leave. Leave 
should only be denied in the clearest of cases.
Leave judges should be mindful that there is substantial disagreement 
within the court on refugee law matters, and that they do not know who 
the JR judge would be if leave is granted. When evaluating whether an 
application has any reasonable prospect of success, a leave judge should 
not consider whether the applicant would have any reasonable prospect 
for success on the merits if she were the JR judge. What the leave judge 
should consider is whether the application will have any reasonable 
prospect of success before any judge on the court.
Applications for leave should be read generously, and applicants 
should be given the benefit of the doubt. Although the applicant bears 
the burden of proof, leave judges should be sensitive to challenges relating 
to access to justice and to the difficulties many applicants face in terms of 
securing competent counsel—especially at a time when legal aid programs 
across Canada are under increasing financial pressure. Where applicants 
are unrepresented or appear to be represented by substandard counsel, 
leave judges should be especially careful to consider whether the record 
154.  I am grateful to Lorne Waldman for suggesting a number of these principles.
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discloses a reasonably arguable case, even if the applicant’s memorandum 
of argument does not clearly make out such a case.
These principles are admittedly pitched at a high level of abstraction. In 
clarifying the test for leave, it may be appropriate to define more precisely 
the specific circumstances in which leave should be granted. One way 
the court could attempt to develop a more detailed test for leave would 
be to encourage leave judges to issue reasons in a range of cases, both 
where leave is denied and where it is granted. As these reasoned decisions 
accumulated, various criteria would likely emerge, and those criteria could 
perhaps be consolidated in an appellate decision. To further this process, 
other stakeholders155 could propose guidelines for leave determination, 
in the hope of persuading the court to adopt their suggestions. Such a 
dialogue between judges, courts and other stakeholders might bring more 
clarity to a test that currently brings arbitrary results.
D. Implications of Announced Reforms to the Refugee Determination 
System156
While this study has assessed the Federal Court leave requirement 
under the refugee determination system as it now stands, it is important 
to note that major changes to that system are expected in the near future. 
In June 2010, the then-minority Conservative government passed 
the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA),157 which substantially reforms 
the refugee determination system.158 Mere days before most BRRA 
provisions would have come into effect,159 however, the current majority 
155.  Stakeholders might include organizations such as the Canadian Association of Refugee 
Lawyers, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Bar Association’s National 
Immigration Law Section, the Barreau du Québec’s Comité en droit de l’immigration et 
de la citoyenneté, the Refugee Forum, the Refugee Lawyers Association of Ontario, the 
Refugee Law Office, provincial legal aid programs, and legal clinics across Canada.
156.  Citations in this section of the paper are up to date as of 15 August 2012.
157.  SC 2010, c 8.
158.  For a discussion of the BRRA reforms, see Rehaag, “Counsel”, supra note 15 at 77–79; 
Erin C Roth, “Is the Proposed Balanced Refugee Reform Act Balanced?” (2010) 86 Imm LR 
(3d) 168; David Matas, “Balancing” (2010) 88 Imm LR (3d) 212.
159.  Some provisions came into effect immediately on royal assent, but the majority of 
the provisions, including those that reformed the refugee determination process, were to 
come into effect two years after royal assent (unless an earlier date was fixed by order of the 
Governor in Council). See BRRA, supra note 157, s 42.
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Conservative government passed the Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
System Act (PCISA),160 which significantly revises the unimplemented 
BRRA reforms.161 At the time of writing, most of the combined BRRA 
and PCISA reforms are not yet in force and there is no legislative deadline 
for that to happen.162 In addition, to fully implement BRRA and PCISA, 
regulations and rules of procedure at the IRB will need to be revised—
another task that has not yet been completed.163 Therefore, the precise 
content of the reforms to the refugee determination system is still in flux.
That said, for the purposes of assessing the Federal Court judicial 
review process, the following are some of the more salient changes 
expected to the refugee determination system from the combined BRRA 
and PCISA reforms:164
 •  The Minister will have the power to differentiate between classes 
of refugee claimants, and varying refugee determination procedures 
will apply to the different classes. For example, the Minister has the 
discretionary authority to:
 ○ Designate foreign nationals, including refugee claimants, as 
irregular arrivals if they come to Canada in a group and if the 
Minister believes that examinations cannot be conducted in a timely 
manner or reasonably suspects that they arrived in connection 
with certain types of human smuggling;165 and
160.  SC 2012, c 17. 
161.  Confusingly, PCISA does not replace BRRA but instead modifies it. Both acts, in 
turn, modify other legislation, including IRPA. To add to the complexity, one needs to 
consider the coming into force and transitional provisions in all three acts. 
162.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 85.
163.  Draft versions of the rules of procedure and some of the relevant regulations have 
been published but these are not necessarily the final versions, and further regulatory 
changes will be necessary. See Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Canadian Gazette, Vol 146, 
No 32 (11 August 2012); Refugee Protection Division Rules, Canadian Gazette, Vol 146, 
No 32 (11 August 2012); Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations [Processing Timelines], Canadian Gazette, Vol 146, No 31 (4 August 2012) [Draft 
Revised Regulations].
164.  For a more comprehensive outline of the reforms, see Julie Béchard & Sandra 
Elgersma, “Legislative Summary of Bill C-31” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2012), 
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.
165.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 20.
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 ○ designate countries of origin for which success rates in refugee 
claims fall below a certain threshold, or if a country produces only 
a small number of claims, if the Minister is of the view that the 
country meets certain minimal standards of rights protection.166
 •  First-instance RPD refugee determinations will be made by civil 
servants, rather than governor-in-council appointees serving for fixed 
terms, as is currently the case.167
 •  RPD members will be required to declare a refugee claim to be 
manifestly unfounded if the claim is clearly fraudulent.168 This is in 
addition to the existing power to declare a claim to have no credible 
basis if there is no credible or trustworthy evidence supporting it.169
Timelines will also be dramatically expedited. Claimants will have to 
submit Basis of Claim forms either when they make refugee claims (in the 
case of inland claimants) or within 15 days of having their claim referred 
to the IRB (in the case of claims made at the port of entry).170 This replaces 
the current practice whereby all claimants must complete a Personal 
Information Form within 28 days after a claim is referred to the IRB.171 
In addition, RPD hearings will be scheduled within 60 days of referral for 
regular claimants, within 30 days for inland claimants from designated 
countries, and within 45 days for port of entry claimants from designated 
countries.172 Under the existing system, in contrast, hearings are generally 
not held for several months (and sometimes years) after referral.173
Under the new reforms, some claimants will get access to an appeal 
on the merits to the RAD,174 which will be staffed by governor-in-council 
166.  Ibid, s 58.
167.  Ibid, s 48.
168.  Ibid, s 57.
169.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 107.
170.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra 
note 21, s 159.8).
171.  RPD Rules, supra note 10, r 6.
172.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra 
note 21, s 159.9).
173.  In July 2012, the government estimated average processing times prior to RPD 
hearings at 19 months. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Backgrounder—
Summary of Changes to Canada’s Refugee System” (29 June 2012), online: Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca> [CIC, “Backgrounder”].
174.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 36.
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appointees.175 However, timelines for appeals will be extremely tight, 
with only 15 days to file and perfect an application.176 Moreover, there 
will be no access to the RAD for any of the following:
 •  Claimants designated as irregular arrivals;
 •  claimants from designated countries of origin;
 •  claimants whose refugee claims were declared to be manifestly 
unfounded;
 •  claimants whose refugee claims were declared to have no credible 
basis;
 •  claimants who came by land from the United States and were 
admitted to Canada because they fell within an exception to the Safe 
Third Country Agreement;
 •  claimants whose claims have been abandoned or withdrawn;
 •  claimants whose previously successful refugee claims were vacated 
by the RPD due to fraud; or
 •  claimants who previously secured refugee protection, but whose 
status was removed by the RPD due to cessation procedures.177
Unsuccessful refugee claimants will be able to apply to the Federal 
Court for leave for judicial review of RAD decisions, or of RPD decisions 
in the case of claimants who are not entitled to access the RAD.178 The 
175.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 159.
176.  Draft Revised Regulations, supra note 163, s 1 (modifying IRPA Regulations, supra 
note 21, s 159.91).
177.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 36. Accordign to section 108(1) of IRPA, refugees can have 
their refugee status removed through cessation procedures where:
(a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country 
of nationality;
(b) the person has voluntarily re-acquired their nationality;
(c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the 
country of that new nationality;
(d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person 
left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee 
protection in Canada; or
(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. 
For a discussion of loss of status through cessation, see Jones & Baglay, supra note 1 at 
250–52.
178.  IRPA, supra note 3, s 72.
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process for these applications, and the standards to be applied, will 
generally remain as they are now. One exception is that most classes of 
refugee claimants who are not entitled to access the RAD will no longer 
benefit from an automatic stay of removal pending judicial review.179
Access to alternative procedures through which refugee claimants 
may seek to remain in Canada will be further restricted. For example, 
unsuccessful refugee claimants will be prohibited from accessing H&C 
applications or PRRAs for at least one year. For claimants from designated 
countries, the restriction on PRRAs lasts for three years, and for claimants 
designated as irregular arrivals, the restriction on H&C applications lasts 
for five years.180 Meanwhile, removal of unsuccessful refugee claimants 
will have to occur “as soon as possible”.181
With regard to these expected reforms, it should be noted that 
advocates for refugees have long called for the implementation of an 
appeal on the merits of the RAD, partly because of limitations in the 
Federal Court judicial review process.182 If the RAD is in fact brought 
into existence through the combined BRRA and PCISA reforms, some 
might argue that resorting to Federal Court judicial review will no longer 
be the only means to catch errors made by a single adjudicator, because 
the RAD will at least in some cases be able to do that. This might arguably 
lead some to conclude that consistency in Federal Court decision making 
in this area (and the troubling findings of the present study) will become 
less important.
In my view, however, the opposite conclusion is warranted for several 
reasons. First, there are concerns about the new cohort of civil servant 
RPD members who will be making first instance refugee determinations. 
If the transition is handled properly, this change presents an opportunity 
to enhance professionalism and consistency in decision making at the 
179.  This will require a modification of IRPA Regulations, supra note 21, s 231. For the 
announced intention to make this revision, see CIC, “Backgrounder”, supra note 173.
180.  PCISA, supra note 160, ss 13, 38. These provisions have already come into effect. See 
IRPA, supra note 3, ss 25, 112.
181.  PCISA, supra note 160, s 20.
182.  See note 15 and accompanying text. See also Hurley, supra note 118 at 380–86.
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RPD.183 If it is handled incorrectly, the independence of the IRB as a 
whole may be compromised. That would be a serious matter, given how 
vigorously the current government makes known its doubts about the 
bona fides of whole groups of refugee claimants.184 Moreover, regardless of 
how well the transition is handled, there will inevitably be a long period 
of learning and adjustment for new decision makers, at both the RPD and 
RAD levels, and more errors will be made during that period.
Second, the expedited timelines will likely lead to more errors in 
refugee adjudication. Errors resulting from unreasonably short time limits 
will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable claimants, including 
LGBTQ claimants, gender-based claimants and those who have suffered 
torture or severe trauma. These types of claimants need the most time to 
retain and instruct counsel, to prepare their applications and to prepare 
for their refugee hearings.185
183.  The existing system whereby RPD members are governor-in-council appointees has 
long been criticized, both for the quality of appointees and the frequent use of appointments 
for political patronage. For a summary of some of the critiques, see Rehaag, “Troubling”, 
supra note 16 at 355–58.
184.  See e.g. Clark Campbell, “Minister calls for overhaul of Canada’s refugee system”, 
The Globe and Mail (15 July 2009) A1, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.
theglobeandmail.com>; Nicholas Keung, “Czech Roma to sue board for ‘biases,’ lawyer 
says”, Toronto Star (17 July 2009) A12, online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com>; 
Jason Kenney, “Canada’s commitment to refugees: Celebrating successes and reflecting 
on the challenges ahead” (Speaking Notes, 27 November 2008), online: Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada Media Centre <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media>.
185.  As Peter Showler, former Chair of the IRB, testifying before the Parliamentary 
committee considering these reforms, stated: “In regard to the [revised] refugee claim process 
itself, I must say candidly that the time limits are simply too short and will undermine 
its fairness and its efficiency”. House of Commons, Evidence at the Standing Committee 
on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess (30 April 2012) (Peter Showler) at 
1540. See also Canadian Bar Association, National Immigration Law Section, “Bill C-31: 
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 2–4, 16–19, 22–23, online: The Canadian 
Bar Association <http://www.cba.org> [CBA, “Bill C-31 Brief”]; Canadian Council for 
Refugees, “Bill C31—Diminishing Refugee Protection” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the 
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 9, online:  Canadian Council for 
Refugees <http://ccrweb.ca>; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “Fair Refugee 
Outcomes Depend on Fair Processes” (April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at 2–3 (on file with author) [CARL, “Bill C-31 
Brief”]; Refugee Forum, “Fast, Fair and Efficient Refugee Decisions: Are they possible?” 
(April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
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Third, and in my view most importantly, while the implementation of 
an appeal on the merits to the RAD is a positive step, the limits on access 
to the RAD under the BRRA/PCISA reforms are extremely worrisome. 
Depending on which countries are selected as designated countries of 
origin, large numbers of refugee claimants may not have access to the 
RAD.186 Worse yet, RPD members will be able to insulate their decisions 
from review by the RAD simply by declaring claims to be manifestly 
unfounded or to have no credible basis. There is evidence that some RPD 
members with unusually low refugee claim grant rates are also much 
more likely to make these sorts of declarations.187
Taken together, the expected BRRA/PCISA reforms do, in my view, 
offer important opportunities to improve the refugee determination 
process. However some of the limitations of these reforms (especially the 
extremely tight timelines and restrictions on access to an appeal) indicate 
that striving for access to a fair and consistent decision-making process 
for Federal Court review of IRB refugee determinations remains at least 
as pressing as ever.
Conclusion
This study, using a comprehensive dataset of over 23 000 cases from 
2005 to 2010, demonstrates that outcomes in applications for judicial 
review in the refugee law context all too often hinge on who decides 
at 4–8 (on file with author) [Refugee Forum, “Bill C-31 Brief”]; Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, “Bill C-31: An Unjustified Assault on the Rights of People in Danger” (30 
April 2012), Brief submitted to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
at 7, online: Canadian Civil Liberties Association <http://ccla.org> [CCLA, “Bill C-31 
Brief”].
186.  CBA, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note 185 at 19–21; CARL, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note 
185 at 4–5; Refugee Forum, “Bill C-31 Brief”, supra note 185 at 8–10; CCLA, “Bill C-31 
Brief”, supra note 185 at 7.
187.  For example, RPD Member David McBean, who had a 0% refugee claim grant rate 
from 2008 to 2010, was much more likely than his colleagues to declare claims to have 
no credible basis. See Keung, “Luck”, supra note 17 at A1; Nicholas Keung, “Widowed, 
wounded, no refuge; federal judge blasts ruling by refugee board member with zero 
acceptance rate”, Toronto Star (9 March 2011) A1, online" The Star <http://www.thestar.
com>. Data on refugee claim grant rates (including “no credible basis rates”) for all RPD 
members from 2006 to 2011 is available via links at Rehaag, “Data”, supra note 16. 
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the case. The study also shows that the leave requirement, at least as it 
has been applied in recent years, creates an arbitrary limit on access to 
justice for refugees. These findings confirm earlier empirical research, 
with every major study over the past 20 years coming to essentially the 
same conclusion: the process is unfair and needs to be reformed. While 
there are reasons to be concerned about consistency and fairness at both 
the leave stage and the merits stage of judicial review, inconsistency at the 
leave stage affects far more applicants, and the decision-making process 
at the leave stage lacks even the modest accountability and transparency 
found at the merits stage. As a result, this article has set out a number of 
possible reforms, including eliminating the leave requirement, reforming 
the procedures through which leave is decided, and clarifying the test for 
leave.
I would like to end by emphasizing a point made earlier: it goes 
without saying that all judicial decision making inevitably involves some 
degree of variability across judges. Judges are human beings, and we want 
them to be human beings. We want them to be more than machines 
applying algorithms. The purpose of this study was not merely to show 
that who decides an application matters, and that in borderline cases 
an applicant might succeed before one judge but fail before another; its 
purpose was to see whether the processes followed and the tests applied 
in applications for judicial review of refugee determinations ensure an 
acceptable level of consistency and fairness. In my view, the data shows 
that the level of variability at the leave stage is too high, and that the 
status quo is unsustainable—both in terms of the processes followed and 
the tests applied. Reform is urgently needed, especially in light of the 
anticipated changes to Canada’s refugee determination system.
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Appendix
Table 1: Overview: Outcomes by Applicant Type (All Cases)
Leave Outcomes
Applicant 
Type
Denied 
(Not 
Perfected)
Denied 
(Perfected)
Granted 
(Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Withdrawn Pending Total Leave 
Grant 
Rate 
(%)
Minister 2 12 14 64 34 7 133 58.65
Claimant 4 666 14 535 404 2 846 462 1 22 914 14.18
Total 4 668 14 547 418 2 910 496 8 23 047 14.44
Judicial Review Outcomes (Where Leave Was Granted)
Applicant 
Type
Denied Granted 
(Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Withdrawn Pending Total 
(Leave 
Granted)
JR Grant 
Rate 
(Leave 
Granted) 
(%)
JR 
Grant 
Rate 
(All 
Cases) 
(%)
Minister 24 2 47 5 0 78 62.82 36.84
Claimant 1 697 305 1 110 137 2 3 251 43.53 6.18
Total 1 721 307 1 157 142 2 3 329 43.98 6.35
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Chart 1: Leave Granted Rates (%) for Judges Deciding 50+ Cases 
(Perfected Cases Only, Excluding Campbell J)
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Table 3: Judicial Review Outcomes by Judge (Where Leave Granted)†
JR Judge Denied Granted 
(Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total (Leave 
Granted)
Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
Campbell 9 5 108 122 92.31
Hansen 10 7 27 44 72.97
O’Keefe 32 7 63 102 66.32
Mandamin 24 6 37 67 60.66
Dawson 23 4 30 57 56.60
Russell 44 4 52 100 54.17
Mactavish 32 3 35 70 52.24
MacKay 1 0 1 2 50.00
O’Reilly 46 4 43 93 48.31
Lemieux 34 9 31 74 47.69
Scott 12 0 10 22 45.45
Heneghan 33 8 27 68 45.00
Blanchard 18 4 14 36 43.75
Barnes 47 6 36 89 43.37
Layden-Stevenson 17 3 13 33 43.33
Simpson 8 4 6 18 42.86
Strayer 4 0 3 7 42.86
Mainville 11 0 8 19 42.11
Phelan 65 3 47 115 41.96
Gauthier 30 4 19 53 38.78
Kelen 45 5 27 77 37.50
Hughes 54 93 32 179 37.21
Lutfy 22 3 13 38 37.14
Zinn 34 5 20 59 37.04
Rouleau 14 1 8 23 36.36
Harrington 57 10 32 99 35.96
Snider 74 13 39 126 34.51
Finckenstein 19 0 10 29 34.48
Shore 92 20 47 159 33.81
Mosley 47 7 24 78 33.80
Noël 46 7 23 76 33.33
Teitlebaum 27 5 13 45 32.50
Rennie 19 1 9 29 32.14
Martineau 51 4 23 78 31.08
Tremblay-Lamer 51 7 21 79 29.17
Beaudry 99 5 40 144 28.78
Frenette 25 2 10 37 28.57
de Montigny 69 9 27 105 28.13
Bédard 19 0 6 25 24.00
Pinard 76 3 23 102 23.23
Lagacé 53 2 13 68 19.70
Near 34 1 8 43 19.05
Gibson 64 8 15 87 18.99
Crampton 35 2 8 45 18.60
Tannenbaum 10 0 2 12 16.67
Blais 26 6 4 36 13.33
Boivin 35 3 3 41 7.89
Aalto 0 1 0 1 n/a
Lafrenière 0 1 0 1 n/a
Total 1 697 305 1 110 3 112 39.54
†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge 
was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 4: Outcomes by Demographics of Judges
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†
Leave Judge Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total Leave Grant 
Rate (%)*
Female 3 175 138 598 3 911 15.85
Male 11 358 266 2 248 13 872 16.52
Liberal Party 
Appointee
11 589 339 2 482 14 410 17.64
Conservative 
Party 
Appointee
2 944 65 364 3 373 11.00
Total 14 533 404 2 846 17 783 16.38
JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†
JR Judge Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total (Leave 
Granted)
JR Grant 
Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
Female 297 53 223 573 42.88
Male 1 400 252 887 2 539 38.78
Liberal Party 
Appointee
1 235 258 920 2 413 42.69
Conservative 
Party 
Appointee
462 47 190 699 29.14
Total 1 697 305 1 110 3 112 39.54
Table 5: Outcomes by City Where Application Filed
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†
City Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total Leave Grant 
Rate (%)*
Montreal 5 667 23 811 6 501 12.52
Toronto 7 982 322 1 720 10 024 17.73
Other 884 59 315 1 258 26.27
Total 14 533 404 2 846 17 783 16.38
JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†
City Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total (Leave 
Granted)
JR Grant 
Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
Montreal 560 51 190 801 25.33
Toronto 965 194 790 1 949 45.01
Other 172 60 130 362 43.05
Total 1 697 305 1 110 3 112 39.54
†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge 
(leave outcomes) or JR judge (JR outcomes) was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 6: Leave Outcomes by Judge Deciding Leave in Application 
Filed in Toronto (Perfected Cases Only)†
JR Judge Denied Granted 
(Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
Campbell 40 9 147 196 78.61
Shore 251 12 176 439 41.22
Bedard 14 1 8 23 36.36
Blanchard 93 2 47 142 33.57
Martineau 180 9 87 276 32.58
Mainville 32 3 15 50 31.91
Montigny 172 10 62 244 26.50
O’Keefe 233 11 80 324 25.56
Russell 235 7 79 321 25.16
Barnes 155 5 51 211 24.76
Mactavish 320 17 101 438 23.99
Simpson 83 2 26 111 23.85
Hansen 237 15 64 316 21.26
Heneghan 322 14 77 413 19.30
Gauthier 113 5 27 145 19.29
Lagacé 22 0 5 27 18.52
Zinn 121 1 27 149 18.24
O’Reilly 351 7 74 432 17.41
Mandamin 91 1 19 111 17.27
Mosley 377 10 69 456 15.47
Beaudry 186 6 34 226 15.45
Tremblay-Lamer 208 9 36 253 14.75
Dawson 243 19 41 303 14.44
Scott 12 2 2 16 14.29
Lemieux 242 13 40 295 14.18
Pinard 103 5 17 125 14.17
Teitlebaum 108 8 17 133 13.60
Rennie 57 0 8 65 12.31
Frenette 43 1 6 50 12.24
Phelan 196 9 25 230 11.31
Kelen 633 17 80 730 11.22
Gibson 237 13 26 276 9.89
Rouleau 78 3 8 89 9.30
Hughes 196 14 20 230 9.26
Lutfy 69 1 7 77 9.21
MacKay 11 0 1 12 8.33
Snider 446 11 39 496 8.04
Noël 199 6 17 222 7.87
Harrington 296 7 22 325 6.92
Layden-
Stevenson
233 23 17 273 6.80
Boivin 72 1 2 75 2.70
Blais 113 4 3 120 2.59
Near 360 8 8 376 2.17
Crampton 120 1 2 123 1.64
Finckenstein 78 0 1 79 1.27
Hugessen 1 0 0 1 0.00
Total 7 982 322 1 720 10 024 17.73
†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge 
was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
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Table 7: Outcomes by Year Application Filed
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†
Year Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total Leave Grant 
Rate (%)*
2005 3 496 89 619 4 204 15.04
2006 2 499 88 465 3 052 15.69
2007 1 571 58 368 1 997 18.98
2008 1 796 56 346 2 198 16.15
2009 2 318 58 435 2 811 15.80
2010 2 853 55 613 3 521 17.69
Total 14 533 404 2 846 17 783 16.38
JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†
Year Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total (Leave 
Granted)
JR Grant 
Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
2005 372 54 250 676 40.19
2006 251 59 221 531 46.82
2007 223 39 144 406 39.24
2008 210 49 123 382 36.94
2009 257 52 168 477 39.53
2010 384 52 204 640 34.69
Total 1 697 305 1 110 3 112 39.54
Table 8: Outcomes for Applications Filed Before and After Dunsmuir
Leave Outcomes (Perfected Cases Only)†
Application 
Filed Before/
After 
Dunsmuir
Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total Leave Grant 
Rate (%)*
Before 7 906 245 1 515 9 666 16.08
After 6 627 159 1 331 8 117 16.73
Total 14 533 404 2 846 17 783 16.38
JR Outcomes (Where Leave Granted)†
Application 
Filed Before/
After 
Dunsmuir
Denied Granted (Un-
Opposed)
Granted 
(Opposed)
Total (Leave 
Granted)
JR Grant 
Rate (Leave 
Granted) (%)*
Before 877 160 646 1 683 42.42
After 820 145 464 1 429 36.14
Total 1 697 305 1 110 3 112 39.54
†  Excluding cases where the Minister was the applicant and cases where the leave judge 
(leave outcomes) or JR judge (JR outcomes) was not identified.
*  Excluding cases granted unopposed.
